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Abstract 
Three Essays on Poverty, Social Services, and Advice-Giving 
 
Samantha Snow Plummer, PhD 
 
University of Pittsburgh, 2019 
 
 
 
 
In this dissertation, I critique the ‘poverty knowledge’ generated by cultural sociology and 
examine how its disavowal of politics, preoccupation with behavior, commitment to appearing 
nonjudgmental, and understatement of structural causes manifest in social service organizations 
targeting different populations.  
I begin by reviewing the past decade of cultural sociological research on poverty. I show 
that cultural sociologists draw boundaries between their ‘empirical’ questions and the ‘political’ 
demands of their critics and argue that they thereby obfuscate both research that challenges their 
agenda and their own ideological commitment to liberalism. This commitment is most evident in 
the behavioral focus of their research, which leads them to untenable conclusions that are also 
incompatible with their professed desire to avoid victim-blaming narratives.  
I then examine an increasingly popular approach to raising public awareness about poverty 
and training people the state expects to work on the poor: The Poverty Simulation. The Poverty 
Simulation is an immersive experience in which middle-class individuals role-play limited aspects 
of the lives of poor and low-income family members as they navigate everyday life. I show that 
simulation facilitators trust in negative, arousing feelings to convince participants of the difficulty 
of living in poverty and to motivate them to adopt an empathetic interactional style. Yet, even as 
facilitators guide participants toward experiences of negative emotional states, they also deflect 
them from experiences of conflict and the political.  
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Finally, I compare how experts in two organizations that target different 
populations/problems—women in (economic) transition and chronically/intergenerationally poor 
people—give financial advice to their clients. I argue that personal finance experts’ claims that we 
are culturally silent about money provide them with an “advisor’s benefit,” i.e., the appearance of 
being able to free others from silence and ignorance and guide them toward financial wellness. I 
then show that experts’ enactment of the advisor’s benefit is conditioned by organizations’ 
temporal frames. I conclude that while it can be less depoliticizing than focusing on the future, 
emphasizing the habituality of (financial) thoughts and behaviors deemphasizes the importance of 
money and material resources, not to mention politics, in explanations of poverty and social 
change.  
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1.0 The Poverty of the Culture of Poverty: Culture, Cognition, and the Clash of 
Competences in the New Cultural Sociology of Poverty 
1.1 Introduction 
In 2010, the editors of “Reconsidering Culture and Poverty,” a much-publicized1 issue of 
the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, declare that “culture is back 
on the poverty research agenda” (Small, Harding, and Lamont 2010: 6). Asserting and lamenting 
its long absence from scholarship on poverty, they laud social scientists’ renewed interest in 
“asking questions about the role of culture in many aspects of poverty and even explicitly 
explaining the behavior of the low-income population in reference to cultural factors” (ibid.). 
According to their narrative, which is promulgated by many of the issue’s contributors (e.g., 
Vaisey, 2010) and other cultural sociologists (e.g., Patterson, 2014), scholars have until recently 
shied away from studying the culture-poverty relationship because of its association with the 
“culture of poverty” theory typically attributed to Oscar Lewis.2 Though the structural component 
 
1 The Annals issue received coverage in the New York Times (Cohen, 2010); National Public Radio (Conan, 
2010); and Salon (Battistoni, 2010), among other outlets.  
2 Though Lewis is most often associated with the term “culture of poverty,” the notion that poor people 
possess a self-perpetuating cultural deficiency dates back to the Chicago-school of the 1920s, which marked a turn 
away from the political economy framework that characterized Progressive Era investigations of poverty and toward 
social psychological and cultural approaches (O’Connor, 2001). Another point worth making is that the distinguishing 
characteristic of Moynihan’s report vis-à-vis social scientific research linking culture and poverty is its emphasis on 
the matriarchal family as the primary source of Black poverty (Moynihan, 1965).  
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of his argument is often downplayed, Lewis contends that persistent, intergenerational poverty 
produces a maladaptive culture that takes on a life of its own and would perpetuate even if the 
structural conditions that generated it changed. Daniel Patrick Moynihan (1965) famously touts 
similar ideas, arguing that the Black family was mired in a “tangle of pathology” and referring to 
its “deterioration” as “the fundamental source of the weakness of the Negro [sic] community at the 
present time.” Small, Harding, and Lamont (2010) argue that the “new” approach to the cultural 
sociology of poverty “conceives of culture in substantially different ways” (8; emphasis in original) 
from the victim-blaming and racist approach of Lewis and Moynihan.   
Sociologists iteratively cite (Butler, 1993) this narrative of sociology’s vilification of Lewis 
and Moynihan and cultural sociology’s abandonment of poverty research (e.g., Patterson, 2014; 
Massey, 2014), often to justify a cultural analysis that follows.3 Though some sociologists issue 
predictable critiques about the primacy of structural explanations (e.g., Gans, 2012), only one 
scholar uses cultural sociology’s own tools to illuminate the limitations of its approach—both 
“old” and “new”—to poverty knowledge. Using a method he calls “cultural diagnostics,” 
Rodríguez-Muñiz (2015) reveals that the cultural sociology of poverty is characterized by a 
myopic fixture on the poor that is perpetuated by the narrative of abandonment. 
 
3 Interestingly, over twenty years before Small, Harding, and Lamont (2010), Mercer Sullivan (1989) also 
took to the Annals to promulgate nearly the exact same narrative about culture and the study of poverty. 
“Unfortunately,” he writes, “the role of culture in these social changes remains as neglected as it has been since the 
days when overly vague notions of the culture of poverty brought disrepute to the culture concept as a tool for 
understanding the effects of the concentration of poverty among cultural minorities” (49). Thus, Small, Harding, and 
Lamont’s narrative is itself performative.  
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In this paper, I extend Rodríguez-Muñiz’s critical evaluation of the cultural sociology of 
poverty and inequality in three ways. First, I demonstrate that the “new” cultural sociologists of 
poverty draw a symbolic boundary between their “empirical” questions and concerns and the 
“political” concerns of their critics. I argue this rhetorical strategy obfuscates both empirical work 
that undermines their agenda and their own ideological commitment to liberalism. Second, I argue 
that despite claims to the contrary, cultural sociologists are interested in poor people’s meaning-
making processes only to the extent that they can use the latter to explain behavior and outcomes 
they associate with mobility. Eager to avoid painting a homogenous picture of poor people, the 
“new” cultural sociology emphasizes their behavioral and perspectival heterogeneity; yet, it also 
relies (often implicitly) on a uniform ‘mainstream’ reference group to interpret its findings. This 
‘mainstream’ moreover serves as cultural sociologists’ imagined audience of myth-holders whose 
stereotypes of the poor can be expunged by depictions of their agony and normalcy. Third, I argue 
that efforts to normalize (groups of) poor people and evidence that normative commitments are 
class-invariant conflict with cultural sociologists’ interest in finding a causal link between culture 
and behaviors that (ostensibly) lead to (im)mobility. Over the past decade or so, a group of prolific 
cultural sociologists, all influenced by Bourdieu, has imported frameworks from the 
neurocognitive sciences to account for the disconnect between declarative commitments and 
behavior by appealing to a typically unobserved level of cognition. In so doing, they cast inequality 
and poverty as outcomes of a largely consensual process, in the sense that prevalent misrecognition 
and acceptance of the rules of the game manifests as consensus, for which no one—neither the 
advantaged nor disadvantaged—is to blame. I conclude that while the pioneers of cultural 
sociology’s cognitive turn present their approach as a break with commonsense schemas or “folk  
psychology”, their “categories of analysis” are functionally indistinguishable from the “categories 
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of practice” used in social service organizations that target poor people (Brubaker and Cooper 
2000).  
1.2 An Overview of Rodríguez-Muñiz’s Cultural Diagnostic of Poverty Knowledge 
Rodríguez-Muñiz (2015) devises a brilliant analytic strategy he calls “cultural diagnostics” 
to reveal the “cultural infrastructures”—the set of epistemological and ontological commitments 
that organize knowledge production—of the “new” cultural sociology of poverty. “Cultural 
diagnostics” has three moves: cartographic analysis, narrative analysis, and boundary-work 
analysis. Cartographic analysis seeks to identify what he calls “ontological myopias,” which are 
products of inherited ontological commitments about the composition of the social world and the 
parameters of an object of study. Narrative analysis examines how scholars in a given field 
describe and frame the history of the field and characterize their intervention. Boundary-work 
analysis interrogates how scholars position their work in relation to this narrative and what 
symbolic boundaries they draw in a given field. 
In its focus on ontological myopias, cultural diagnostics differs somewhat from the 
analytical strategies of the sociology of epistemologies, which “investigates the epistemological 
bases of people’s ideas, beliefs, and understandings, and societies’ norms, practices, and 
institutions” (Abend, 2018: 90). The sociology of epistemologies asks what the standards are for 
something counting as knowledge, how people and institutions validate knowledge claims, what 
they treat as acceptable evidence, and what they consider to be knowable to begin with (ibid.). 
Like cultural diagnostics, the sociology of epistemologies also examines the objects of knowledge 
claims—how “epistemic communities construe, conceive of, and publicly represent and work with 
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these objects; how they’re demarcated; and what’s thereby assumed about them and about the 
world” (ibid., 92).   
Rodríguez-Muñiz’s application of cultural diagnostics to the cultural sociological study of 
poverty reveals an ontological myopia that constricts poverty research to studies of the poor and a 
limited set of “thematics” (e.g., sexuality, violence, and unemployment). This myopic focus on the 
poor and etiolated account of their lifeworlds has the effect of separating poor people from their 
sociological environments, often unwittingly reinforcing stereotypes, and treating poverty as an 
object rather than a relation. His narrative analysis demonstrates that “new” studies of culture in 
the context of poverty promulgate a narrative of abandonment—that sociologists had until the 
recent ‘cultural turn’ avoided the topic of culture in studies of poverty due to fears of being accused 
of “blaming the victim.” This narrative suggests that “a major weakness of our poverty knowledge 
stems from the substantive abandonment of culture” and “envisions the recent inclusion of cultural 
sociological tools as a sign of progress, capable of improving our understanding of poverty and 
the lives of the poor” (Rodríguez-Muñiz, 2015: 108). The “new” cultural sociology of poverty 
draws symbolic boundaries between its “more sophisticated” (Small, Harding, and Lamont, 2010: 
13) conceptual toolkit and the imprecise and unsound one of past approaches. In so doing, it casts 
the problem with the latter “as largely a conceptual problem, which therefore requires conceptual 
solutions rather than a broader overhaul of the cultural infrastructures of poverty knowledge” 
(Rodríguez-Muñiz, 2015: 110-111).  
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1.3 Disavowing Politics 
Advocates of the “new” scholarship on culture in the context of poverty draw symbolic 
boundaries between not only their “sophisticated” concepts and the crude ideas of yesteryear, but 
also their “empirical” orientation and the “political” or “ideological” orientation of their critics.4 
At the same time, however, they often make a point of identifying their personal political identities 
and/or defending their theoretical frameworks and empirical findings as not conservative. I show 
that the political/empirical boundary is based on two assumptions. First, cultural sociologists 
assume that their imagined detractors—they never cite the scholars from whom they defend 
 
4 Drawing boundaries between “political” and “empirical” questions and concerns is related to longstanding 
debates over objectivity that were recently reignited by Mary Romero’s presidential candidate statement for the 
American Sociological Association (ASA) and the announcement of the 2019 ASA Meeting theme, “Engaging Social 
Justice for a Better World.”. In her candidate statement, Romero advocated for scholar-activism in the academy, 
writing that “we cannot shield ourselves with false notions of ‘objectivity,’ but, as previous presidents have 
emphasized, ASA actively embraces public engagement and scholar-activism…ASA must continue to emphasize 
social justice in sociological inquiry.” (This link contains a collection of Twitter reactions to the announcement put 
together by Dustin Stoltz, a PhD candidate in Sociology at Notre Dame: 
https://twitter.com/i/moments/1042148467085402116?lang=en Vaisey, whose work I discuss below, is among 
Romero’s detractors). In an issue of Contexts that focused on the violent White supremacist demonstrations in 
Charlottesville, Virginia, Kimberly Kay Hoang (2018) analyzed the debates within sociology over the relationship 
between scholarship and activism. “There is a contradiction in our discipline,” she writes. “Public sociology 
proponents are supporting a particular market-structure of scholar activism that separates the ‘resident expert’ from 
the ‘scholar activist.’ This form of public sociology favors research examining those struggling under and against the 
effects of power relations (e.g., protesters, poor people) while marginalizing researchers scrutinizing how institutions 
of power operate to maintain relations of domination (e.g., through institutional racism).”  
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themselves—oppose (or would oppose) the study of culture in the context of poverty because of 
political/ideological/normative5 commitments rather than empirical findings. Second, cultural 
sociologists assume that their selection of objects and questions is not animated by ideological 
commitments. Before turning to an explication of these assumptions I will further establish how 
cultural sociologists go about drawing the political/empirical boundary. 
In setting up the boundary between their scholarship and the critiques of their imagined 
detractors, cultural sociologists of poverty sometimes seek to establish first that they are not who 
their detractors supposedly think they are. Predicting complaints that promoting a return to culture 
in poverty scholarship is tantamount to advancing a conservative agenda of victim-blaming, Small, 
Harding, and Lamont (2010) declare that none of them is “on the right of the political spectrum” 
(13). However, they are quick to state, “our political orientation is beside the point. Whether, when, 
and how cultural tools and cultural constraints matter is ultimately an empirical, not a political 
question” (ibid.). Given print journals’ emphasis on parsimony, it is curious that the authors 
mention where they position themselves on a left-right political spectrum—or, more aptly (and 
awkwardly), where they don’t position themselves—if it were “beside the point.” This rhetorical 
device draws attention to their political stance by affirming its irrelevance for their research; a 
similar tactic to what rhetoricians call apophasis, it enables them to publicize their non-
conservative identity while advocating for a research agenda that is not not conservative and 
disavowing the salience of political orientation in the first place.  
 
5 In characterizing their imagined critics, they use these words interchangeably and always in juxtaposition 
to “empirical” or “scientific.”  
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Interestingly, while some cultural sociologists disavow the importance of their political 
identities, others proclaim their political identities. In a recent interview published in the 
Newsletter of the American Sociological Association’s Culture Section, for example, Orlando 
Patterson responded to a question about how he became interested in the study of culture by 
discussing his rootedness in the Marxian tradition and radical politics. Patterson, whose research 
and commentary critics have characterized as conservative6, explained that the “irony” of his work 
being “viewed with great suspicion” is that outside of the US he is “viewed as a neo-Marxist radical 
because [he] was a special advisor to—other than Fidel Castro—the most radical prime minister 
in the hemisphere, Michael Manley. We tried to start a revolution!,” as if being a part of the Marxist 
 
6 In 1991, Patterson took to the New York Times to comment on Anita Hill’s testimony at Clarence Thomas’s 
Supreme Court confirmation hearings in an Op-Ed titled “Race, Gender and Liberal Fallacies.” He wrote that Hill’s 
decision to testify to the Thomas’ sexual harassment was “unfair and disingenuous” because, as a Black Southerner 
of working-class background, she surely “understood the psycho-cultural context in which  Judge Thomas allegedly 
regaled her with his Rabelaisian humor (possibly as a way of affirming their common origins).” Though he was largely 
saddened by the hearings, one “great good” to come out of them was “the revelation to the average white American 
that…not all African Americans are underclass cocaine junkies and criminals.” He also took time to lambast the 
feminist movement for demanding both “a rigorously enforced protocol of gender relations in the workplace” and 
“the same intimate bonding that men of power traditionally share” but not explaining how “nonerotic intimacy 
between men and women [is] possible.” Why some might call him conservative is also made clear in his more recent 
work on the connections between poverty and “black youth culture,” which he describes as “a distinctive, destructive 
cultural configuration that celebrates hypermasculinity, violence, territorial gang warfare, sexual predation and a 
generally misogynistic contempt for women, extreme materialism, and livelihood from an underground economy that 
ranges between the hustle and the criminal, the cultural focus of the entirety being the defense of a primal honour 
schema” (Patterson, 2015: 4; see also Patterson and Fosse, 2015). When reading this definition, I could not help but 
think that it seemed a more accurate description of Wall Street or the Republican party.  
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tradition is incompatible with being conservative with respect to culture and individual behavior. 
Once establishing his political identity (or, at least, his political self-identification), Patterson goes 
on to pronounce his desire for sociologists to be “less dogmatic” about the influence of culture on 
“important outcomes such as poverty.” In his scholarship, Patterson (2014) links the “dogmatic 
rejection of causal explanations” to cultural sociologists’ “oversensitivity to identity politics and 
claims” and “fear of being labeled racists or essentialists” (2). After affirming his Leftist bona 
fides, Patterson promotes a narrative claiming that critical perspectives on culture’s explanatory 
value stem solely from political correctness. 
Other scholars do not espouse a political identification in their scholarship, but nonetheless 
take a similar defensive posture toward imagined critics, drawing a boundary between “empirical” 
and “ideological” or “political” issues. Examining the effects of educational ideals and 
expectations on educational continuation for poor and non-poor youth, Vaisey(2010) finds that 
ideals (what kids want) are a better predictor of poor youth’s educational continuation (a decision) 
than expectations (what kids anticipate) whereas the opposite is true for non-poor youth. He 
concludes that this finding suggests that poor youth’s desires (culture) have a direct influence, 
distinct from perceptions of material constraints, on their behavior. Reflecting on what this means 
for the cultural sociology of poverty, Vaisey (2010) states: 
The moral and political fear of blaming the poor and sociologists’ 
overreaction to the limits of earlier models of culture have prevented us from 
asking whether the cultural models and motives that the poor internalize might 
have an ‘exogenous explanatory power’ that serves to inhibit socioeconomic 
success. If we leave aside unnecessary ideas about ‘dated’ approaches to culture 
we might find it unsurprising that those who grow up poor are—on average—
10 
different from the nonpoor in how they conceive of education and that these 
conceptions might—on average—motivate them to pursue life strategies that 
are locally adaptive but globally disadvantageous. Obviously, as critics of 
motivational models of culture have repeatedly emphasized, we will never find a 
cultural domain in which all poor youth differ from all nonpoor youth, nor one in 
which all poor youth converge on an identical way of seeing and evaluating the 
world. Nevertheless, different central tendencies in motives across groups 
probably play some role in creating different central tendencies in behavior 
across groups.  Finding such differences and evaluating  their   importance is 
ultimately an empirical concern, not an ideological one (96).  
In this framing, intransigent sociologists forsook the study of the (causal) relationship 
between culture and poverty because of “moral and political fear” and not because of empirical 
investigations concluding that poor people’s desires were not central to understanding poverty and 
inequality and/or that these desires were ultimately products of material conditions. The tone of 
this statement also suggests that moral or political concerns both can and should be excised from 
the research process. Tellingly, while he asserts that finding and assessing these differences is not 
an ideological concern, he does not mention whether looking for them is. Without a clear definition 
of what he means by “ideological”, it is hard to evaluate this claim. But, given his findings, it is 
hard to imagine that his selection of an object, if not his methods, was not exogenously motivated. 
In her Presidential Address to the 2015 Meetings of the American Sociological 
Association, Paula England takes a different tack to the question of politics and empirics in the 
context of research on disadvantage. Though England is not a cultural sociologist per se, her 
argument and narrative are largely indistinguishable from those put forward by the authors 
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discussed above and demonstrate the pervasiveness of this form of boundary work in discussions 
of poverty and inequality that include measures of culture. “In this address,” she writes, “I defend 
views [of how constraints affect outcomes] involving personal characteristics against their 
detractors” (2016: 5). Her definition of personal characteristics—“things individuals carry across 
situations such as skills, habits, identities, worldviews, preferences, or values” that are “molded by 
the constraints associated with social positions” (6)—is largely indistinguishable from what many 
sociologists talk about when they use culture as an explanatory resource. Why do the detractors 
detract and why are they wrong to do so?  
Like other defenders of the “new” cultural sociology of poverty, England (2016) asserts 
that her uncited critics think highlighting “personal characteristics” in explanations of inequality 
is victim blaming. She also notes, though, that detractors from her project are likely worried about 
differentiating sociology from other fields like psychology or economics whose unit of analysis is 
the individual. She tenders two reasons for defending a model that includes personal characteristics 
as mediating variables between the constraints emanating from social positions and individual 
outcomes: 
First, as a matter of getting the science right, I believe that important 
outcomes often emerge through this two-step mechanism. Second, as a normative 
matter, I disagree with the claim that recognizing the role of personal 
characteristics in causing negative outcomes entails blaming the victims for 
their personal characteristics and their outcomes.7 
7 England repeats this argument in a co-authored piece from the same year (England, Cuadillo, Littlejohn, 
Bass, and Reed, 2016). There, they define efficacy as “a part of culture” and write that their “intent was to contribute 
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Again, in this narrative, those concerned about victim-blaming are motivated by normative 
commitments and not empirical or scientific findings; those committed to good science will be 
amenable to her two-step explanation.8 Near the end of her Address she expands on why she finds 
the victim-blaming accusation and other “political” critiques unconvincing. Responding to the 
(uncited) “political” claim that models causally linking personal characteristics to disadvantage 
“encourage changing the characteristics of disadvantaged people, while leaving constraints intact,” 
she states that “in fact, the models I offered imply that one way to change personal characteristics 
 
to the scientific understanding of why inconsistent contraception occurs, not to make moral claims about who is to 
blame. Moral claims are largely beyond our scope here, except to say that we do not see explaining behavior in terms 
of a personal characteristic such as efficacy to imply blame and that a sensible normative theory should not hold 
individuals entirely responsible for characteristics arising from how they were socialized, which neighborhoods and 
schools influenced them, or what other opportunities they had, all factors that are probably important elements of 
efficacy” (13). The logic of self-efficacy is the same as the logic of the savings bank and financial education: “the 
exploitation of the future to blackmail the present.” England, et al. define it as “the ability to organize one’s behavior 
in service to one’s goals.”    
8 One of England’s (2015) behavioral outcomes of interest is contraception use, which, obviously, is linked 
to (nonmarital) childbearing. There are ‘class’ differences in contraception use among women who do not want to get 
pregnant that she argues cannot be explained by access or cost because contraception is covered by Medicaid and 
readily available at Planned Parenthood. She suggests that what might explain these class differences in contraception 
use is class differences in self-efficacy (a personal characteristic), which she defines as a mixture of belief in one’s 
ability to achieve a goal and ability to self-regulate in the present to achieve that goal (aka an ability to delay 
gratification). Setting aside questions about women who live in one of the fourteen states that rejected Medicaid 
expansion, she seems to ignore “reproductive abuse” as a method of coercive control and the possibility that men’s 
coercive control of women’s access to care, contraceptive tech, and its effective use present “barriers” to effective 
contraception.   
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is to change the constraints that shape them” (21). What is revealing about her rejoinder to the 
‘political’ claim is that she does not state that policy should not seek to change personal 
characteristics; on the contrary, she upholds the modification of personal characteristics as a 
worthwhile objective as though expediency and concern with “evidence-based” strategies for 
change were not “political” or “ideological” and as though her model were in fact “best.”9 
Underlying the boundary work that separates the ‘empirical’ concerns of cultural sociology 
from the concerns of its imagined detractors lies the assumption that those detractors’ complaints 
are (or will be) based in ideological commitments rather than empirical findings. According to this 
narrative, the only reasons that one might oppose the ‘reconsideration of culture and poverty’ or 
the inclusion of ‘personal characteristics’ in models of individual outcomes are fears of victim-
blaming or disciplinary collapse. The erasure of any other possible reason for opposition leaves 
the reader to believe that there is no empirically grounded reason to reject cultural explanations of 
poverty and no empirical problems with these “models,” which are often in fact poorly specified. 
Yet, the individual outcomes that the cultural sociology of poverty tends to focus on and 
conceptualize as cultural, like single motherhood, low education, unemployment, and young 
headship, have no automatic connection to poverty and reducing them would do little to reduce 
poverty; among 29 rich democracies, the US has below average prevalences of these ‘risks’ but 
the second to highest poverty rate (Brady, Finnigan, and Hübgen, 2017; see also Ray and Tillman, 
2018). Not only does focusing on these individual characteristics reinforce stereotypes (even and 
 
9 England’s style of reasoning is reflected in the common cultural sociological argument that we should not 
support ‘anti-poverty’ marriage promotion policies because poor women already value marriage. This argument does 
nothing to undermine the notion that marriage formation is a worthwhile goal of public policy. It thereby protects 
marriage’s exalted status, which is part of why its reality as a site of violence is often misrecognized.  
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perhaps especially when noting that not all poor people exhibit them), it also suggests that the 
empirical problem is the characteristics themselves rather than the penalties associated with those 
characteristics, which are greater for Black people and Latinos (Brady, Finnigan, and Hübgen, 
2017).10 In neglecting this fact, the cultural sociology of poverty ironically misses out on 
interesting empirical questions that no doubt would benefit greatly from their analytical toolkit, 
e.g., Why are the penalties higher in the US than in other rich democracies? Why are the 
prevalences lower? Why are the penalties higher in some US states than in others? How do certain 
prevalences come to be penalized? Such questions refocus attention from the characteristics of 
poor people, which have little to do with the reproduction or reduction of poverty, towards the 
political, economic, and, yes, cultural configurations that structure poverty and inequality (see, for 
example, Fox, 2012 and Michener, 2018).  
The political/empirical boundary is also premised on cultural sociologists’ assumption that 
the questions they pose are untainted by their ideological or political beliefs, which, nonetheless, 
they are wont to reveal. From this perspective, the facts—the empirics—say what they say and, as 
a matter of “getting the science right,” researchers cannot avoid inconvenient truths; empirical 
questions have no politics. But, their commitment to rational empirical investigation as a source 
of social reform, avoidance of politics, use of individualized measures, and rejection of class as an 
analytic category all betray an ideological commitment to liberalism that suffuses their questions 
 
10 If I created an economic system that distributed income according to eye color, height, and belief in 
vaccines, I presume that researchers would not seek to understand the causes of poverty by following around or 
interviewing individuals with a certain set of those characteristics even if they all happened to live in the same 
neighborhood. Ironically, it seems that researchers’ preoccupation with certain ‘risks’ is the result of their own cultural 
and political hang-ups.  
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and the objects of their knowledge claims. As Alice O’Connor notes (2002: 8), “poverty 
knowledge is fundamentally ideological in nature.” The “new” cultural sociology of poverty is no 
exception.  
1.4 Culture and Comportment 
The cultural sociology of poverty’s emphasis on behavior and faith in behavioral 
explanation to precipitate social change are, perhaps, the clearest evidence of its liberalism. 
Rodríguez-Muñiz asserts that the cultural sociology of poverty has sought primarily to understand 
how poor people make meaning out of their lives. I argue that cultural sociologists are interested 
in poor people’s meaning-making processes to the extent that they can (claim to) causally link 
them to certain kinds of behavioral outcomes, specifically those they associate, however 
incorrectly, with mobility. Efforts to highlight the cultural and behavioral heterogeneity of poor 
communities end up replacing a theory of the “culture of poverty” with a theory of the “culture of 
mobility,” one which, ironically, relies on the imputation of a shared culture to one (unmarked and 
unstudied) group—the ‘mainstream’, ‘dominant’, ‘non-poor’, or ‘middle-class’ (see also 
Desmond, 2014 and Choo and Ferree, 2010). Research that searches for cultural differences 
between the poor and the middle-class often finds that despite having differences in outcomes they 
often report few or no differences in reflective beliefs, values, frames, or narratives. To preserve 
the causal model linking culture to the behaviors they associate with mobility, cultural sociologists 
have started to search for, and reinterpret past findings to account for, differences at a typically 
unobserved level of cognition. In so doing, they can reconceptualize poverty and inequality as 
unintentional (i.e., blameless) outcomes of a non-agonistic (consensual?) process. Before turning 
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to a discussion of cultural sociology’s cognitive turn, though, I establish its behavioral emphasis 
and show that its commitment to emphasizing cultural heterogeneity is tempered by its 
commitment to the “culture of (im)mobility” theory. 
The “new” cultural sociology of poverty is primarily concerned with culture’s role in 
explaining poor people’s behavior (e.g., not saving money, which is the result of failure to budget, 
failure of foresight, failure to defer gratification, and failure of economic rationality) and outcomes 
ultimately attributable to behavior (e.g., nonmarital birth, which is the result of nonmarital sex, 
failure to contracept or terminate the pregnancy, and failure to marry). In their call for a 
reconsideration of culture and poverty, Small, Harding, and Lamont (2010) contend that poverty 
scholars should be concerned with culture because of evidence of “significant variation in 
behavior, decision-making, and outcomes among people living in seemingly identical structural 
conditions” (9; and see footnote 1). From their perspective, evidence of a diversity of reactions to 
the same material constraints counts as evidence of a causal role for culture in explaining 
differences in behavior and decision-making, which, in turn, explain why poor people differ in 
how they cope with poverty and whether they ‘escape’ it.11 From this perspective, poor people’s 
culture(s)—specifically Black/inner-city/urban poor people’s culture—is either a survival strategy 
or a means of escape; it is a culture without aesthetic or hedonic value (Kelley, 1997).  
 
11 To be clear, they do not suggest that poverty is in the main a product of individual behavior, but rather that 
the latter, over and above material conditions, explains individual coping methods and mobility. In this reading, 
material conditions are necessary to explain poverty but not sufficient to explain mobility. The unfortunate fact is that 
individual decision-making matters very little for mobility, especially for Black people, surveillance of whose 
behaviors concerns poverty scholars across the social sciences as well as policymakers across the political spectrum 
(Hamilton and Darity, 2017; see also Ratcliffe and Kalish, 2017).   
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Behavioral variation in the face of ‘seemingly identical structural conditions’ is but one of 
three discernable logics propelling cultural sociologists’ research on culture’s causal role in 
mobility. The second is the inverse of the first: “poor neighborhoods are culturally heterogeneous, 
and so they contain a heterogeneous array of behaviors and outcomes” (Small, Harding, and 
Lamont, 2010: 15). This logic also depends on the background assumption that poor people face 
similar material constraints, but whereas per the first logic evidence of behavioral heterogeneity 
implies the existence of cultural heterogeneity, per the second logic evidence of cultural 
heterogeneity implies the existence of behavioral heterogeneity (even if the latter is unobserved). 
The third logic differs from the first and second by downplaying heterogeneity amongst the poor 
and focusing, instead, on associations between average differences—or differences in central 
tendencies—in the outcomes and cultural characteristics of the poor and non-poor (e.g., Vaisey, 
2010; England, 2016). Yet, all three of these logics imply or ascribe a shared (or, at minimum, 
dominant) culture to one group, namely, the ‘mainstream’ or ‘middle-class.’ Despite claiming that 
part of what separates the “new” from the “old” cultural sociology of poverty is the former’s 
renunciation of “ideas that members of a group or nation share a ‘culture’ or that a group’s culture 
is more or less coherent or internally consistent” (Small, Harding, and Lamont, 2010: 8)12, cultural 
sociologists’ cultural explanations of coping and mobility rely on the notion of a culturally 
coherent (white) middle-class. This culturally coherent (white) middle-class is also the audience 
 
12 See also Lamont and Small’s (2008) claim that “the idea that races or ethnic groups have a culture…is 
unhelpful to the study of racial differences in poverty. Intragroup differences are often larger than intergroup 
differences. Consequently, our understanding of racial disparities in poverty does not account for these as a function 
of inherent ethnic cultures. Instead of imputing a shared culture to groups, we study empirically how individuals make 
sense of their lives” (79).  
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cultural sociologists of poverty have in mind when they set out to “debunk existing myths about 
the cultural orientations of the poor” (Small, Harding, and Lamont, 2010: 10).  
Both the first and second logic affirm, from different directions, that cultural heterogeneity 
amongst the poor is associated with behavioral heterogeneity amongst the poor. Whereas the “old” 
culture of poverty theory was a theory of class reproduction, the theory of cultural heterogeneity 
seeks to explain both reproduction and mobility (cf Streib 2018). Most often, scholars do not 
investigate mobility per se—i.e., whether individuals experience a significant change in their 
economic standing—but rather relationships between culture and certain behaviors they associate, 
however loosely, with social (im)mobility.  
Fosse (2010), for example, justifies his examination of the relationship between “inner-city 
men’s infidelity” and their cultural logics by pointing to the association between the former and 
poor single women’s sustained singlehood, and poor unmarried parents’ relationship dissolution—
outcomes that are obviously negatively associated with marriage, a major goal of US poverty 
policy (126). Guided by the first logic of the “new” cultural studies of poverty, he identifies 
behavioral heterogeneity amongst poor heterosexual men—some are monogamous, and others are 
not—and compares their cultural repertoires. He finds that poor men interpret sexual infidelity 
using three logics—doubt, duty, and destiny—each of which is structured by their relationship to 
monogamy. All poor men express generalized doubt about women’s fidelity, but monogamous 
men describe finding a ‘good girl’ who mitigates doubt; all poor men express a sense of duty 
beyond their sexual relationships, but whereas non-monogamous men’s sense of obligation is 
limited to their male friends, monogamous men feel obliged to family, children, and God; finally, 
much like England’s sample of self-inefficacious poor women, non-monogamous men describe 
their destinies in terms of short-term plans, whereas monogamous men describe longer time 
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horizons. Fosse (2010) is careful not to describe the logic of monogamous men as “middle-class,” 
but because he provides no data on non-poor heterosexual men’s sexuality and explicitly links 
infidelity to relationship failure and poverty reproduction, he ends up implying that non-poor 
heterosexual men do not cheat.13 Furthermore, though he contends that his findings demonstrate 
how “multiple cultural logics operate when guiding a single behavior or set of behaviors (in this 
case, infidelity)” (139), it is impossible to know whether the men he interviewed deploy the 
cultural logics he describes in the act of cheating or not cheating; does the behavior guide the logic 
or does the logic guide the behavior?  
Harding, like Fosse, is interested in poor people’s sexual relationships and outcomes that 
stem from them. In a highly cited article, he examines the relationship between neighborhood 
disadvantage and cultural heterogeneity, which he measures using responses to National 
Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health questions that assess respondents’ ideal relationship 
scripts and pregnancy frames (Harding, 2007). He tests and refutes Wilson’s (1987) social isolation 
theory, which holds that deindustrialization combined with middle-class black flight from poor 
neighborhoods left behind an urban underclass whose values deviate significantly from middle-
class culture and are uniformly shared. Instead, he finds that more disadvantaged neighborhoods 
are more culturally heterogeneous. He shows that adolescents who live in culturally heterogenous 
neighborhoods are less likely that adolescents who live in culturally homogenous neighborhoods 
to behave in ways that cohere with their relationship scripts and pregnancy frames. He concludes 
that “heterogeneity in cultural lifestyles or orientations can be understood as the failure of more 
 
13 To my knowledge, there is not a single study showing class differences in infidelity amongst heterosexual 
men. Adamopolou (2013) finds that socioeconomic status is not a driver of infidelity.  
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middle-class or mainstream residents of disadvantaged neighborhoods to regulate behavior in their 
communities” (2007:360, italics mine).14  
While his statistical findings suggest that cultural heterogeneity predicts behavioral 
heterogeneity, his conclusion is that behavioral heterogeneity, specifically the presence of non-
mainstream behavior due to neighborhood regulatory failure, drives cultural heterogeneity. 
Arguing against social isolation theory, he writes that “rather than being disconnected from 
mainstream society, poor urban residents live in cultural environments that include both local 
elements and elements from the wider society and that these disparate elements are often 
contradictory and competing” (2007: 360, italics mine). Thus, he defines cultural heterogeneity as 
a mixture of ‘local’ (read: deviant) and ‘middle-class’ elements. In so doing, he actually supports 
the notion of an “underclass” because, in his reading, middle-class values emanate from the 
presence of middle-class people, who despite being physically ‘local’ are culturally delocalized or 
part of ‘wider society’. Similar studies of the effect of cultural heterogeneity on (violent) behavior 
in poor neighborhoods define the former as the “coexistence of conventional and deviant models” 
(Berg et al., 2012). ‘Conventional’ and ‘deviant’ may not be types a la Anderson’s (1999) ‘decent’ 
and ‘street’ ghetto dwellers, but they are still behaviorally-and culturally-defined reductive 
categories. 
 
14 Similar ideas undergird the US Department of Housing and Urban Development’s Housing Opportunities 
for People Everywhere program, commonly known as HOPE VI, and the mixed-income housing it funds. One of the 
fundamental assumptions of HOPE VI is that income diversity will provide poor and low-income people with “role 
models.” Studies of mixed-income communities have found little to no evidence to support the notion that interaction 
with higher-income people leads to behavioral change in lower-income people. Instead, higher-income people used 
their resources to increase security and policing (Chaskin and Joseph, 2011; Graves, 2011). 
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In addition to advancing a uniform notion of the middle-class or ‘mainstream’, Harding’s 
conclusions suggest that the elevation or diffusion of middle-class ‘cultural lifestyles’ or 
‘conventional cultural models’ would lead to behaviors that increase the chance of economic 
mobility. Yet, as Sandra Smith’s (2007, 2010) work shows, the dominance of “mainstream” values 
within a neighborhood or community can potentially lead to behavior that decreases opportunities 
for upward mobility. She finds that “inner-city” Black jobholders are unlikely to refer their Black 
job-seeking friends and family to their own employers partly because the former deployed “widely 
available and deeply held scripts that make sense of pervasive and chronic joblessness in terms of 
individuals’ moral shortcomings—unwillingness to take personal responsibility and to strive for 
self-sufficiency” and therefore “often interpreted the jobseeking behaviors of their relations to be 
insincere expressions of work motivation” (Smith, 2010: 32). 
In more recent research on cultural and behavioral heterogeneity amongst the poor—this 
time in relation to debt management strategies rather than sexual behavior—Tach and Greene 
(2014) also reveal that low-income people are deeply committed to the American God of self-
sufficiency. Unlike Fosse and Harding, Tach and Greene (2014) do not identify variation at the 
level of the poor as a group—that is, they do not slice up the poor into dichotomous behaviorally-
defined (e.g., monogamous/non-monogamous) or culturally-defined (mainstream/local) groups—
but rather discover variation in the debt management strategies of families within and across 
income groups of low-income people. Debt, they note, plays a major role in reproducing inequality 
and arresting social mobility but, before the publication of their research, little was known about 
how poor people make sense out of and respond to debt. To fill this hole in the universe of 
information about poor people’s behavior, Tach and Greene (2014) interview 194 heads of 
household in lower-income families and find that the latter’s most common debt management 
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strategies are influenced by three cultural narratives. When poor people see debt repayment as 
necessary to “make ends meet” they engage in debt juggling; when they feel a debt is unjust, they 
ignore it; and when they associate debts with economic mobility goals they prioritize and pay 
them. All three of these narratives—making ends meet, injustice, and economic mobility—are 
joined by a common thread: “the strong desire for families to maintain social identities as 
financially independent, responsible citizens” (17).  
Because they find that debts are embedded in cultural narratives that shape how people 
manage them, Tach and Greene (2014) assert that “while economic standing is clearly associated 
with the ability to pay on debts, our results suggest that this is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for debt repayment” (17). The sufficient condition for debt repayment is, from the 
authors’ perspective, that families view the latter as consistent with financially responsible, self-
sufficient social identities. So, instead of advocating for debt relief or policies that would change 
poor families’ economic standing or prohibit predatory lending practices that low-income people 
(correctly!) interpret as unjust, Tach and Greene (2014: 18) recommend policy ‘nudges’ that tie 
debt repayment to mobility goals (e.g. homeownership) that, in turn, appeal to poor families’ 
aspirational identities.  
The notion that economic standing is necessary but not sufficient to explain low-income 
people’s debt repayment strategy is a way of saying that something other than their income and 
garden-variety economic rationality under conditions of uncertainty and scarcity explains debt 
repayment. Yet, given that the aspiration to self-sufficiency and financial responsibility is 
widespread and class-invariant in the US, it is unclear why it would account for class differences 
in debt repayment (not to mention debt acquisition). A much simpler and more coherent 
explanation of why, for example, poor people do not file for bankruptcy while middle class people 
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do is that, ironically, filing costs money.15 Furthermore, the practices of for-profit “lower ed” 
institutions lay bare the fact that companies can and do capitalize on people’s mobility goals, desire 
for self-sufficiency, and lack of access to traditional mobility pathways, further indebting and 
rarely credentialing them (Cottom, 2017); perpetuating the self-sufficiency narrative through 
‘nudges’ is an appropriable strategy that can be used toward maleficent ends. Finally, the evidence 
they offer to support their argument that people ignore debts that threaten their financially self-
sufficient identities is unconvincing; their own data show that poor people juggle debts because 
they can’t pay all of them16 and the reason poor people don’t use a ‘narrative of making ends meet’ 
to describe usurious credit card or medical debt is because paying the latter is not required to make 
 
15 The Chapter 7 filing fee is $335 USD and the Chapter 13 filing fee is $310USD. With a lawyer, the cost 
of Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings range from $1,500-$3,000USD and $3,000-$4,000 respectively 
(O’Connor, 2017). There is a fee waiver available for individuals and families whose income is less than 150 percent 
of the official poverty guidelines, but that waiver does not apply to lawyers’ costs.  
16 Coral Nicholson, a respondent, says “I wish I could just have one whole month where I could pay every 
bill on time in the entire amount. But with me, I can’t, it’s always something” (12). Gloria Diaz told them, “[I’m] just 
surviving. I would have to choose…like one month I’ll pay my bill and I would leave one without paying, next month 
that’s the one I have to pay” (13). They note that families with incomes between $16,000 and $26,000 pay fewer of 
their debts on time than families with incomes between $26,000 and $40,000, but argue that ability to pay is not the 
only factor driving decisions about how to manage debts because there is more variation in debt management strategies 
within income groups than across them. I suspect, however, that despite being in the same income bracket, people 
who make $40,000 per year pay off more of their debts on time than those who make $30,000. Unfortunately, they do 
not provide this information and their sample size does not allow for hypothesis testing of this kind anyway. In short, 
it is likely their claim about variation—a claim that offers justificatory support for their cultural project—is based on 
an artefact of their categorization.      
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ends meet.17 Ultimately, their claim that economic standing is necessary but insufficient to explain 
debt management practices suggests that even if low-income people had more money, they would 
not pay off the debts that conflicted with their aspirational identities, but research the authors cite 
on uses of the Earned Income Tax Credit belies that claim (Sykes et al., 2014). Their “cultural” 
explanation for patterned debt repayment assumes that the financially responsible, self-sufficient 
social identity is unequivocally good—something to appeal to rather than challenge.   
Cultural sociologists’ attempts to link analyses of poor people’s culture to explanations of 
mobility are based in problematic and ultimately untenable assumptions of inherent connections 
between culture and certain behaviors and between those behaviors and economic achievement. 
Though I dealt with assumptions about the latter connection in the previous section, it bears 
repeating here that there is no inherent connection between infidelity and poverty or single 
parenthood and poverty or even, as everyone since Marx except Weber has argued, wealth and 
work effort. Assuming that some scholars are resigned to the US’s current system of rewards and 
penalties, and that rather than try to understand it want to explain the (deviant) behavior of 
individual poor people within it, cultural concepts still do not seem to hold much value. Most 
standard measures of culture (e.g. beliefs, values) are class-invariant; surveys and interviews reveal 
 
17 While they provide interview excerpts showing a general aversion to welfare amongst their respondents—
probably because the data are drawn from a larger study on families who receive the Earned Income Tax Credit—the 
excerpts they use to show that people don’t pay debts they find unjust in no way suggest that people do not pay because 
of an attachment to a self-sufficient identity; they don’t pay these debts because compound interest and other structural 
features of credit card and other forms of debt make them impossible to pay in full. Finally, that the authors refer 
several times to exorbitant interest rates and hidden fees as “perceived injustices” suggests that they a) do not share 
this “perception” and b) believe “injustices” are a matter of low-income people’s mindset.  
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that poor and non-poor people value education and marriage at similar rates and share a host of 
other normative expectations and frames, including self-sufficiency narratives.18 This finding 
makes it difficult to link beliefs, values, and narratives to social class in either causal direction. 
Furthermore, cultural sociologists reliance on a typically unobserved (white) middle-class as a 
reference point for classifying the behavior and culture of poor (Black) people not only undermines 
their purported commitment to heterogeneity, but also feeds misrecognition; it perpetuates the 
perception that the middle-class is a moral standard bearer and unreflectively produces white 
privilege as culturally available to anyone willing to “act normal” (Choo and Ferree, 2010).  
Most cultural sociology of poverty is not written for or by people who share the experiences 
of its subjects; this is especially true of ‘ghetto’ ethnographies (Young, 2008). The audience for 
this research—the holders of uninformed, “straightforward beliefs about the cultural orientations 
of the poor or of ethnic minorities” that need to be assessed through empirical work (Small, 
Harding, Lamont, 2010: 10)—shapes its investigative quest and conditions a paradox that is at the 
heart of cultural analyses of poverty. On the one hand, researchers want to render understandable 
poor people’s behavior or outcomes by appealing to their audience’s common-sense intuitions 
about motives and incentives. They often do this by revealing the cultural similarities between 
(groups of) poor people and ‘the mainstream.’ Even where researchers find that the content of poor 
people’s cultural orientations is different from that of the mainstream’s, they intend to show that 
the process of developing those orientations is similar for both (Young, 2008). They believe that 
 
18 People who have received means-tested benefits are more likely than those who have not to state that the 
government has the responsibility to care for those who cannot care for themselves, but not by much (62% to 54%) 
(Morrin, Taylor, and Patten, 2012). One doesn’t need cultural concepts to explain this and many other attitudinal 
differences.  
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alerting their audience to its similarities with the (Black) poor—that revealing that the latter’s 
commitments or style of reasoning are similar to the former’s—will inspire empathy and 
understanding in the former. On the other hand, for culture to be an explanatory resource—for it 
to be relevant in explanations of divergent outcomes and individual behavior—there need to be 
cultural differences between poor and non-poor people and those differences need to connect 
causally to behaviors typically associated with (im)mobility and inequality.  
Cultural sociologists have acknowledged this tension. In an article on cultural diversity and 
anti-poverty policy, Lamont and Small (2010) write, “in our view, a key to the eradication of 
poverty lies not in encouraging the poor to adopt the beliefs of the mainstream (since the 
mainstream and poor often do not differ substantially on average and also both hold self-
contradictory beliefs) but in better understanding and channeling heterogeneity” (170).19 Given 
 
19 They do not define explicitly what “better understanding and channeling heterogeneity” means, but they 
do advocate for a capabilities approach to understanding and addressing poverty (Lamont and Small, 2010: 170). The 
capabilities approach, originated by Sen (1979; 1999) and developed significantly by Nussbaum (2001, 2013), is a 
theoretical framework and policy paradigm that asserts that the freedom to achieve well-being is of the utmost moral 
importance and that it should be understood in terms of people’s capabilities, i.e., their freedom to do and be what 
they have reason to value. Culture, in this framework, is “part of the set of capabilities people have—the constraints, 
technologies, and framing devices that condition how decisions are made and coordinated across different actors” 
(Rao and Walton, 2004: 4). The capabilities approach is a normative, not explanatory, theory, so it is ironic that Small 
and Lamont would adopt it given their aversion to non-empirical commitments. Yet, the capabilities approach is 
arguably useful for overcoming the paradox I describe above. Per this approach, poverty constrains people’s 
capabilities by limiting not only their access to the material means (e.g., commodities) of achieving well-being, but 
also their cognitive means. Although ‘the poor’ and ‘the mainstream’ may not differ in terms of their reflective 
normative commitments they do differ in their cognitive resources for behaving in accordance with those 
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that ‘the poor’ and ‘the mainstream’ do not differ in their normative commitments, Lamont and 
Small (2010) emphasize the need to understand the ‘cognitive’ dimensions of culture and how they 
are affected by poverty. Though Lamont and Small tout the importance of understanding sense-
making and shared frames20, the cultural sociologists who have most vocally answered their call 
for attention to cognition focus not on sense-making but rather on processes that escape it—the 
un-sensed (and possibly un-sensible). In fact, a broader cognitive turn taking place in cultural 
sociology is in many ways a challenge to the dominance of “sense-making” as an empirical object 
in poverty studies.   
 
commitments. Heterogeneous cognitive capabilities can be “channeled” without attacking poor people’s stated values. 
Again, they do not clarify the connotation of “channeling.” It is worth mentioning, however, the social psychological 
concept of “channel factors,” which are situational details that appear minor but have a critical impact on behavior by 
opening or closing channels. The notion of channel factors is central to behavioral economics and marketing. The 
primary ethical commitment of “nudgers”—those who argue for minor adjustments to “choice architecture” to 
promote (versions of) human welfare—is the “as judged by themselves standard,” which is not incompatible with the 
ethical standards of at least some understandings of the capabilities approach (Sunstein 2016).  
20 It’s unclear why they believe the notion of shared frames is less objectionable than the idea of shared 
values. My assumption is that values relate to morality in a way that frames seemingly do not; how an individual or a 
group thinks about the world and their lives is not as closely linked to notions of “the good” as what an individual or 
a group thinks is important and desirable. If a goal of their project is to promote moral concern for the poor, it makes 
sense that they would want to avoid the ascription of (deviant) values to them.   
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1.5 Culture and Cognition 
Theories in cultural sociology have long relied on assumptions about agents’ cognitive 
processes, but over the past decade a group of young sociologists has invested in making these 
assumptions explicit and formulating a theoretical and empirical agenda at the intersection of 
cognition and culture (e.g., Vaisey, 2009; Strand and Lizardo, 2015; Lizardo, 2017). These 
‘cognitive culturalists’ (Pugh, 2013) are responding to developments within economics, 
psychology, and cognitive science—collectively referred to as judgement and decision-making 
sciences (JDM) (Bruch and Feinberg, 2017; Vaisey and Valentino, 2018)—which they frame as 
both a threat and a boon to the scientific and policy relevance of sociology. For cognitive 
culturalists, JDM concepts and frameworks are a non-politicized (read: scientific) solution to the 
paradox facing the cultural sociology of poverty and inequality and, more generally, a corrective 
to “representationalist” models of belief and interpretivist theories of action. Deploying a dual 
process framework of cognition and enculturation, these scholars account 
descriptively/theoretically for the class-invariance of normative commitments and the apparent 
disconnect between the latter and behavior by appealing to typically unobserved cognitive 
processes. Yet, relying as they do on Bourdieusean class theory, they are unable to articulate 
convincingly the relationship between class and this unobserved level of cognition (see Riley, 
2017).  Furthermore, attempts to ‘culturalize’ JDM concepts by scholars less enthusiastic about 
the promises of cognitive science for sociology (e.g, Lamont, Adler, Park, and Xiang, 2017) are 
liable to reinforce the most pernicious aspects of those concepts and their implications for poverty 
policy. Before addressing these limitations and dangers of cultural cognitivists’ approach to 
poverty and inequality, I describe the history of cognitive science’s rise to prominence in popular, 
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academic, and policy discussions of poverty and outline how cultural sociologists have thus far 
incorporated some of its major concepts and frameworks into their theories of human behavior.   
Since the demise of sociologically informed, community-based action research in the 
1960s, economics has been the dominant social science in the production of poverty knowledge in 
the United States. Its ascendance was enabled by three complementary trends that took root 
following World War II: the “Keynesian Revolution”, the revival of neoclassical labor market 
theory, and the rise of “scientism” (O’Connor, 2001). In the postwar years, U.S. Keynesianism 
shifted from its New Deal focus on redistribution and federal job guarantees to an emphasis on 
increased consumer buying-power, full employment, and market-driven growth. The neoclassical 
revival in labor economics successfully challenged the dominance of the institutionalist tradition, 
which argued that laws, corporate action, and labor unions were more significant in determining 
wage rates and workforce behavior than the laws of supply and demand. Against this view, 
neoclassical theorists—the most influential of whom comprised the Chicago school—contended 
that wages and productivity were products of naturalistic laws of supply and demand and cast trade 
unions and government regulation as obstacles to perfect competition and thus market efficiency. 
Most importantly, they rejected the idea that political and social institutions determine economic 
outcomes and amplified the role of individual actors making rational decisions to invest in their 
human capital (i.e., education and training) on the basis of expected future economic returns. 
Human capital theory implied that growth derived not from institutional arrangements but from 
market returns to personal investments and that differences in human capital—the result of 
differences in individual investment decisions—explained differences in economic outcomes; “it 
made fighting poverty, through human capital investments, compatible with economic growth” 
(O’Connor, 2001: 142). Theoretical shifts within economics were accompanied by a 
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methodological one toward econometrics and “scientific” testing of quantitative hypotheses, 
guiding policy attention and data collection efforts toward objects that can be comprehended and 
evaluated using those tools, i.e., individual-level attributes (O’Connor, 2001; Berman, 2014).  
In the 1960s and 70s, through a concerted effort to sell their way of thinking and establish 
a network of research institutions, economists were able to impose their definition of poverty and 
means of validating knowledge claims about it on poverty policy; economists also benefitted from 
the “objectivity” of their methods, which became increasingly politically attractive in the wake of 
the heated “culture of poverty” debates discussed above. But, the dominance of rational policy 
analysis was not achieved without political struggle and has never been total. Indeed, economists 
and professional policy analysts have consistently incorporated psychological and sociological 
notions of the “culture of poverty” and social pathology into their models when the latter faced 
ideological and empirical challenges. In their plan for the War on Poverty in 1964, for example, 
Johnson administration economists responded to “structuralist” critiques of neoclassical 
economics (á la Gunnar Myrdal) by including community action programs for those who were 
psychologically so outside the social mainstream—trapped in a “cycle of poverty”—that they 
could not be helped by economic growth. In the 1980s and 1990s, facing the inability of their 
apolitical, human capital models to account for the “paradox” of declining wages and increasing 
homelessness in the middle of an economic “boom” or to compete with Conservative attacks on 
the welfare state, liberal policy analysts narrowed their research to focus on welfare dependency, 
skill deficits, and the underclass (O’Connor, 2001).  
The Great Recession of 2008 was the most recent and arguably most significant threat to 
neoclassical assumptions about the efficiency of unregulated markets and the rationality of 
individuals and firms. “How did economics get it so wrong?” asked Paul Krugman (2009) in its 
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wake. The answer: it failed to account for the limitations of human rationality, or, in the words of 
Larry Summers, “There are idiots. Look around” (quoted in Lizza, 2009). The crisis in the utility 
of economic knowledge to explain and produce outcomes provided an opening for the ideas of a 
relatively marginalized social science—cognitive psychology (and cognitive science more 
broadly)—to shape poverty knowledge and broader poverty discourse. Revealing the dominance 
of economists and economic discourse in public policy, the policy applications of cognitive 
psychology have been relabeled “behavioral economics,” much to the chagrin of some pioneering 
psychologists (Singal, 2013).21  
 
21 Hirschman and Berman (2014) discuss three ways that economists have policy effects: attaining 
‘professional authority’, or prestige and legitimacy in certain policy fields; obtaining ‘institutional positions’ within 
organizations that shape policy; and shaping the ‘cognitive infrastructure’ of policymaking by imposing their ‘style 
of reasoning’—ways of thinking about problems and causal assumptions—and ‘policy devices’—sociotechnical tools 
that “turn the messy, endlessly complex world into a formal, calculative order than can be used productively” (796)—
on certain policy fields.  
Perhaps more than psychologists themselves, the ideas of cognitive psychology—specifically, the two-
system model of the brain and the notion of “cognitive bandwidth”—have achieved professional authority in poverty 
policy; these ideas are seen as increasingly relevant for explaining, among other things, social program utilization, 
savings, and food choice amongst the poor as well as the “paradox” of why their behaviors do not align with their 
stated values. The increasing authority of these ideas is, as I mentioned, due in part to the Great Recession and the 
apparent untenability of rational actor assumptions (though, as Mirowski, 2013 argues, behavioral economics is hardly 
a wholesale turn away from human capital theory, nor certainly neoclassical notions of the market). The authority of 
psychological models of cognition has also increased within the academic field of economics (Geiger, 2017), evinced 
perhaps most clearly by the several Nobel Prizes awarded for contributions to behavioral economics over the past two 
decades. As I will argue, the ‘psychology of poverty’ is also attractive for a less obvious reason, i.e., because it enables 
a focus on individual behavior without the appearance of victim-blaming.  
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Behavioral economists reject rational choice assumptions that individuals have access to 
perfect information, a firm set of preferences, and infinite computation skills (Bruch and Feinberg, 
2017). Based on decades of empirical investigations of individuals’ decision-making processes, 
they argue instead that individuals have limited cognitive capacity and time to process 
 
Psychologists and the behavioral economists who employ their ideas have achieved institutional positions of 
power within the poverty research industry. In 2010, the Office of Planning, Research, and Evaluation (OPRE) in the 
Administration for Children and Families launched the Behavioral Interventions to Advance Self-Sufficiency  
(BIAS—an acronym that cutely nods at the many cognitive biases that prevent rational action) project, which 
contracted the Manpower Demonstration Research Center (MDRC) to examine how “tools from behavioral economics 
can improve the well-being” of poor people (Richburg-Hayes, 2014). Though the Trump administration discontinued 
BIAS as an OPRE initiative, it lives on as a project of MDRC’s Center for Applied Behavioral Science. The Urban 
Institute’s US Partnership of Mobility from Poverty, funded by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, includes a 
variety of economists and psychologists who specialize in behavioral science. On an international level, the United 
Nations has partnered with Innovations for Poverty Action to incorporate “behavioral insights” into its 2030 Agenda 
for Sustainable Development and has as its Behavioral Science Advisors two psychologists who were formerly 
members of President Obama’s Social and Behavioral Sciences Team. 
  The professional authority and institutional position of cognitive psychologists and behavioral scientists in 
the poverty policy field has enabled them to shape the latter’s cognitive infrastructure. The way behavioral scientists 
think about poverty; their causal assumptions about the relationship between the structure of cognition and decision-
making; and their methods for explaining and demonstrating that relationship circulate not only through formal 
policymaking bodies, but also in schools of public policy and social work, which train the people who put policy into 
practice at the street-level and work in and start up nonprofit human service organizations (Lipsky, 1983/1969). It is 
worth noting that cognitive psychology’s dual process theory undergirds Cognitive Behavioral Therapy, a popular 
therapeutic and case management modality in the human services. Popular liberal publications like The Atlantic and 
The New York Times have helped publicize psychological perspectives on poverty with headlines like “Your Brain on 
Poverty” (Thompson, 2013), shaping the larger discourse on poverty.  
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information—their rationality is “bounded” (Simon, 1991)—and therefore often rely on heuristics 
to solve problems, which sometimes results in systematic errors, i.e., cognitive biases. Underlying 
decision-making are two types of cognition. Type 1 cognition is characterized by slow learning 
and its operations are fast, automatic, and effortless; it is sometimes referred to as an intuitive 
process. Type 2 cognition is characterized by fast learning and its operations are slow, serial, 
effortful, and deliberately controlled (Kahneman, 2013). These processes are structurally 
dissociable in laboratory and natural settings. Type 1 is “prone to biases and errors,” whereas Type 
2 “typically produces more unbiased and accurate results” (Schilbach, Schofield, and 
Mullainathan, 2016: 435). 
Increasingly, behavioral economists are using the dual process framework to understand 
and explain the relationship between poverty and economic decision-making and the perpetuation 
of poverty. In their book Scarcity, probably the most well-known application of cognitive 
psychology to poverty, Sendhil Mullainathan, an economist, and Eldar Shafir, a psychologist, 
developed the concept of “cognitive bandwidth” to refer to the capacity to use Type 2 cognitive 
processes (2013). Cognitive bandwidth is a resource comprised of cognitive capacity, which 
underlies our problem-solving and reasoning abilities, and executive control, which underlies our 
ability to plan and exert impulse control. People who face and are aware of22 scarcity expend their 
 
22 For Mullainathan and Shafir (2013), scarcity is not “not just a physical constraint. It is a mindset” (12). 
The objective fact that one faces conditions of scarcity is not enough to affect one’s bandwidth; one must also feel the 
scarcity for it to affect decision-making. Hence Schilbach, Schofield, and Mullainathan’s (2016) declaration that future 
research should “work to clarify what it means to ‘feel poor,’ and the mechanisms leading to these 
perceptions…understanding these perceptions helps to classify and identify those likely to experience decrements in 
bandwidth. It is also a first step toward finding ways to limit the impact of bandwidth reductions among the poor” 
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cognitive bandwidth on “tunneling,” i.e., focusing on the management of scarce resources, such 
that they have little left for long-term planning. Importantly, “tunneling” is not irrational; it enables 
people to address their most pressing problems. But it does deplete mental resources (bandwidth), 
leading to the deployment of Type 1, intuitive processes that result in mistakes and bad long-term 
decisions. Type 1 processes conserve cognitive energy and possibly offer hedonistic experiences 
through instant rewards, but ultimately perpetuate poverty through their effects on economic 
decision-making (see also Shah, Mullainathan, and Shafir, 2012; Mani, Mullainathan, Shafir, and 
Zhao, 2013; Adamkovič and Martončik, 2017).   
In a much-publicized series of experiments, for example, Mani and colleagues (2013) 
found that when induced to think about the same financial problem, poorer subjects perform worse 
than richer subjects on cognitive tests. They also tested one set subjects over time and found that 
they perform worse on cognitive tests during periods of financial vulnerability. On average, they 
found that the effect of financial concerns on cognitive capacity corresponds to a (temporary?) loss 
of 13 IQ points. “The poor, in this view, are less capable not because of inherent traits,” they write, 
“but because the very context of poverty imposes load and impedes cognitive capacity. The 
findings, in other words, are not about poor people, but about any people who find themselves 
poor” (980). Or, as Bertrand and colleagues (2006) write, “the poor may exhibit basic weaknesses 
and biases that are similar to those of people from other walks of life, except that in poverty, there 
are narrow margins for error, and the same behaviors often manifest themselves in more 
pronounced ways and can lead to worse outcomes” (8). Unlike richer people, poor people do not 
 
(439). One would be forgiven if they interpreted this statement to mean that the authors weren’t interested in 
addressing the conditions that we call poverty so much as people’s feelings about those conditions.  
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find themselves in “the midst of a system composed of attractive ‘no fee’ options, automatic 
deposits, and so forth, that is built to shelter them from grave or repeated error” (ibid.). In other 
words, all people share cognitive biases, but poor people do not have the time and resources to 
shield them from the consequences of those biases. 
Though behavioral economists and neuroscientists share an understanding of human 
cognition, the latter are more concerned with and certain about the long-term effects of poverty on 
cognitive development. Over the past two decades, neurocognitive researchers have increasingly 
turned their attention to charting the relationship between socioeconomic status, brain structure, 
neural patterns, and cognitive function, using correlational evidence to support brain-based 
explanations of poverty. Though these researchers rely on theories of neuroplasticity to explain 
poverty’s effects on the brain, they often describe these effects as permanent (see Pitts-Taylor, 
2019 for a critical review of this literature). On this point, neuroscientists are similar to cultural 
sociologists, who also view the effects of poverty as durable and see poor people as fundamentally 
different from non-poor people. Both neuroscientists and cultural sociologists engage in a form of 
determinism that advances (neuro)cognitive explanations for social problems even while 
attributing (neuro)cognitive conditions to social causes (Pitts-Taylor, 2019: 13).23  Crucially, both 
 
23 Pitts-Taylor (2019) refers to neuroscientific claims that reify and fix poverty’s biological effects as 
instances of “biosocial determinism.” She distinguishes biosocial determinism from “purely biological determinism” 
on the basis of the former’s allowance for a “two-way influence such that experience also shapes biology” (13). I elect 
here not to use “biological determinism” because the connections that cognitive psychologists draw between the mind 
and brain are not always clear and, as I note, they are ambivalent on the relationship between exposure to scarcity and 
brain development and morphology. 
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also believe that their findings challenge victim-blaming narratives,24 though neuroscientists seem 
much more aware than cultural sociologists that their research could be used for nefarious, or at 
least unintended, purposes (e.g., Hackman and Farah, 2009). 
Cultural sociologists have reacted to the increasing use of cognitive processes to explain 
social phenomena (including, but not limited to, poverty) by urging cognitive scientists to “bring 
culture in” to their causal models (Lamont, Adler, Park, and Xiang, 2017) and, more frequently, 
admonishing cultural sociologists to incorporate psychological theories of cognition into their 
models of culture (Vaisey, 2009; Lizardo, 2017; Cerulo, 2010).25 They are explicit that 
engagement with cognitive science and behavioral economics is crucial not only to sociology’s 
scientific development but also its public and political relevance (Ignatow, 2014; Lizardo, 2014; 
Bruch and Feinberg, 2017; Vaisey and Valentino, 2018; see Pitts-Taylor, 2014 on cultural 
sociologists’ anxiety regarding their place in the neurocognitive turn). “Sociology stands at a 
crossroads,” write Lizardo and Strand (2018), “the main issue is how to deal with the emergence 
of the cognitive neurosciences as a major player in the explanation of human action.”  
 
24 In a presentation at the 2015 International Convention of Psychological Science, for example, 
neuroscientist Martha Farah explained that while surveys show people think poverty is the result of poor choices, 
“neurons don’t deserve blame or credit. They don’t expend effort. They don’t have good or bad behaviors. They just 
behave according to the laws of the natural world” (Sleek, 2015).  
25 Some economic sociologists, particularly those in the Weberian tradition who are chiefly interested in the 
ascription of moral and cultural meanings to money and economic transactions, have sought to distinguish their 
theories from those of cognitive psychology and behavioral economics (Beunza, 2010; Bandelj, Wherry, and Zelizer, 
2017). Yet, these sociologists also claim that the two approaches are complementary.  
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A group of prolific cultural sociologists has taken the road of reconstructing 
(Bourdieusean) practice theory using concepts from cognitive psychology, most importantly the 
dual process framework (DPF). Beginning with Vaisey (2009), these scholars have presented the 
DPF as a challenge to dominant theories of culture in action, principally Swidler’s (1986, 2001) 
tool kit theory and allied approaches to culture [e.g, DiMaggio’s (1997) schemas and Lamont’s 
(1992) repertoire]. Based on the observation that people are bad at consistently and coherently 
accounting for their behavior, tool kit theory and other ‘justificatory’ views of culture argue that 
people’s motivations for action must lie outside of their subjectivities in institutions. Culture’s role 
in action is thus “limited either to imposing constraints on action via one’s available repertoire [a 
loosely organized set of skills] or—most important—to ‘making sense’ of one’s behaviors and 
choices after the fact” (Vaisey, 2009: 1680). Culture, in the tool kit or repertoire approach, is 
largely an “external scaffold” (Lizardo and Strand, 2010) that constrains the available systems, 
frames, and other tools that people use to navigate situations and justify their actions (Strand and 
Lizardo, 2015). In short, it locates motivation for action outside of individuals’ subjective states 
and denies the latter causal efficacy; from the tool kit, framing, and other traditional ‘cognitive’ 
perspectives, culture makes action possible and/or meaningful but does not motivate or cause it. 
The problem with this approach, per the cultural cognitivists, is that it relies on a 
“conception of cultural meanings as propositional, articulated, and logically coimplicated” 
(Vaisey, 2009: 1681), a “folk accounting scheme” that “makes the causal effect of [culture] on 
action exclusively a matter of deductive logic from ideas” (Strand and Lizardo, 2015: 45). 
Swidler’s and others’ conception of culture as explicit mental representations fails to account for 
both types of cognitive processes; the cognitive structure that Swilder and others would require to 
accept motivation by culture does not acknowledge that a) most cognitions work unconsciously 
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and b) people are not likely to be able to articulate them coherently, including in interviews. The 
neuroscience model of dual process cognition thus provides a way to account for the ‘paradox’ 
that drove tool kit theory’s elaboration, i.e., the incoherence of culture and its failure to provide 
retrievable motives. People’s stated values, beliefs, and preferences do not predict their 
behaviors—poor people who don’t want to get pregnant have sex without using contraception, for 
example—because the motivational impulse is (usually) not deliberative (Type 2); it is automatic 
and non-declaratory (Type 1).  
Vaisey, Strand, Lizardo, and a growing group of young scholars (e.g., Lizardo et al., 2016; 
Wood et al., 2018), have looked to Bourdiuesean practice theory as a bridge between cognitive 
science and sociology.26 For Bourdieu, language is not essential to understanding how culture is 
embodied; the form of culture that motivates action is neither acquired nor stored symbolically. 
Instead, culture is acquired through recurrent experiences in particular institutional environments, 
“stored in procedural memory and manifested as a form of ‘skill.’” (Lizardo and Strand, 2009: 
212). These ‘skills’ include both perceptual and motor skills as well as implicit dispositions. They 
are activated, in dual process terms, by type 1 processes, i.e., they operate unconsciously, and 
 
26 Vaisey (2009) and Lizardo and Strand (2009) also reference Giddens’s practice theory and concepts of 
stratified consciousness, but do not make use of his ideas in more recent elaborations of dual process theory; Bourdieu 
occupies a much more central role in their efforts at integrating cognitive science and cultural sociology. In their 
reconceptualization of belief as habit, Strand and Lizardo (2015) also borrow from pragmatist theories of belief, in 
particular those of Peirce, James, and Joas, but ultimately find them inadequate for explaining the persistence of belief 
in the face of problematic situations. Instead, they prefer Bourdieu’s notion of “practical beliefs,” which are durable, 
formed through recurrent experiential patterns, and not subject to decision-making.   
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embodied in the ‘habitus.’ Whereas ‘cultural capital’ is a resource for action (and thus, similar to 
the tool kit), habitus motivates action and informs “improvisation.”  
Though much of their work up to this point has been theoretical, the cognitive culturalists 
have also used DPF-informed practice theory to investigate the cultural causes of behavioral 
differences between the poor and the non-poor (Vaisey, 2010) and to reinterpret past research on 
inequality (2016) and the beliefs and behavior of the poor (Strand and Lizardo, 2015).27 Though 
they provide consistent interpretations of the relationship between cognition and action—making 
their hypotheses accurate by a pragmatist standard of truth—the connections they draw between 
poverty/class and culture are ultimately less convincing.  
Vaisey (2010) uses data from the National Study of Youth and Religion to model the 
relationships between poverty status (income-based), educational ideals and expectations, and 
school continuation. He shows that a smaller percent of poor students report that they would like 
(ideals) and will (expectations) graduate from college than non-poor students. A significantly 
larger percent of poor youth than non-poor youth expect less than their ideal. He does not 
investigate whether there is a causal relationship between poverty status and ideals/expectations, 
only whether the latter predict (motivate) school continuation. Using a diagonal reference model 
to distinguish the effects of ideals and expectations and the discrepancy between them (i.e., a sense 
of educational constraint), he finds that expectations are a better predictor of future behavior than 
ideals, which, along with sense of constraint, are insignificant. But, when he interacts the parameter 
 
27 Sociologists have used the DPF and the notion of automatic cognition to study or make inferences about a 
variety of other phenomena, but I chose these three articles because of their substantive alignment with the focus of 
this essay (see Miles, Charron-Chenier, and Schleifer, 2019 for a review of sociological literature that uses DPF).   
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weighting the relative importance of ideals and expectations with poverty status, he finds that 
expectations matter much more for predicting school continuation of non-poor youth and ideals 
matter much more for poor youth.  
To account for this finding, Vaisey (2010) suggests that because poor youth grow up in 
contexts where schooling is stigmatized their ideals “might matter more for predicting their choices 
because they need to be motivated enough to overcome the surrounding social inertia” (2010: 94). 
Through “socially patterned experiences”, the poor internalize cultural models and motives—
forming a habitus—that “inhibit socioeconomic success” (96). In short, the poor continue to be 
poor partly because they are enculturated to prefer things that are bad for them; “if you want to 
know if a poor teenager will be in school five to six years later, ask her what she ‘ideally would 
like’” (Vaisey, 2010: 92).28 Though this article is included in the Annals issue on the “new” cultural 
sociology of poverty, its conclusions are indistinguishable from the “old” culture of poverty and 
its emphasis on preferences aligns it with mainstream economics. Vaisey (2010) does not test 
alternative explanations for school continuation—he does not even compare the effects of culture 
and incentives, the other major explanation of poverty-perpetuating behaviors (Brady, 2019)—
 
28 In Bourdieusean social theory, preferences are read as indications of capacity to appropriate; there is a 
connection between preferences and practical anticipations. Saying “I like” is actually saying “I can.” This is more 
than a semantic difference; it has practical implications, which should be of concern to scholars with ambitions to 
influence policy. Interventions designed to change people’s desires will be quite different from interventions designed 
to change their assessments of their capacity for action in a given field. Both of these will differ from interventions 
that assume their assessments are correct—or, objectively adjusted to their conditions of formation—and therefore 
attempt to change the conditions that enabled those assessments. Reading preferences as expressions of competences 
also complicates the capabilities approach, which depends on a distinction between values and capabilities. 
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because, he writes, his “primary goal here is to assess the role of ideals and expectations in the 
context of poverty rather than to ‘explain’ educational continuation per se” (90). Yet, his 
commitment to establishing a causal role for culture and interpretation of his findings belie this 
claim.  
Strand and Lizardo (2015) reconceptualize belief as a “species” of “durable habit” formed 
through “repetitive exposure to structured regularities” (53). Belief, following Bourdieusean 
practice theory, is the non-idealized link between actors and their commitments to actions or ideas. 
Actors are durably conditioned by their patterned experiences such that their beliefs are, in a 
baseline condition (Bourdieu’s illusio), adjusted to objective realities found in situations; in this 
condition, reflexive deliberation (Type 2) does not motivate action. Strand and Lizardo (2015) use 
their reconstituted concept of belief to account for early childbearing among “poor inner-city 
young women” who, per Edin and Kefalas (2005), are “no different than their middle-class 
counterparts” with respect to their stated aspirations and beliefs (63). Why, if poor women believe 
that an “intact household was the best place to raise a child,” do they have children out of wedlock? 
Strand and Lizardo (2015) argue that the answer to this question is a mystery only if one has a 
“representationalist” conception of belief. Against the notion of actors as rational utility 
maximizers, they argue that “it is not belief as a reflective assessment of the link between 
childbearing (as an action) and the ‘utility’ associated with the probability of two counterfactual 
worlds (one with children; the other without) that drives the ‘decision’ to have children” (63). 
Instead, based on a rereading of Edin and Kefalas’ (2005) empirical work, they argue that the act 
of childbearing never emerges as an explicit goal that poor young women decide upon and that it 
“cannot be decoupled from a nonreflexive, habitualized belief, acquired early in life, in the 
capacity to be a good (capable) mother” (ibid.). In short, it is not their reflective belief in 
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mainstream norms that drives their behavior, but rather their nonreflective belief in their 
proficiencies for action in relation to the field to which they are habitually adjusted. Because poor 
women’s beliefs correspond to the objective conditions of their neighborhood, they are realistic 
and not irrational.  
In probably the clearest and most sophisticated effort at integrating cognitive neuroscience 
with cultural sociology, Lizardo (2017) uses the dual process framework to ground a flexible 
theory of enculturation and reinterpret the role of culture in ethnoracial and economic inequality 
in educational outcomes. Here, Lizardo is chiefly concerned with the relationship between what 
he calls, following Patterson (2014), nondeclarative and declarative personal culture, which map 
onto Type 1 and Type 2 cognition; their independent relationships to public culture; and the failure 
of declarative personal culture to (always) predict performance. The finding of little ethnoracial or 
class variance in declarative commitments proportionate to differences in educational outcomes 
has led several researchers to conclude that culture does not matter for educational achievement. 
Lizardo argues that this conclusion is based on a biased expectation of strong coupling between 
declarative and nondeclarative personal culture and between both of these and public cultural 
norms (which exist at meso and macro levels). People may know that success in school is 
important but not know how to be successful at school; they may have the requisite declarative 
competences—their discursive commitments may be strongly coupled to public norms—but not 
the requisite nondeclarative cultural competences.  
In Lizardo’s framework, nondeclarative cultural competences include both skills and 
tastes, which do not necessarily covary in relation to public culture; students can develop an 
oppositional declarative culture when, for example, “the institutionalized culture of school is 
hostile to [their] lifestyle-based nondeclarative competences (e.g., those related to speech, dress, 
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cultural tastes, and interactive styles)” and still perform well in school because of their 
nondeclarative academic skills (104). Likewise, middle-class parents can hold declarative 
commitments to their children’s autonomy and self-direction while at the same time implicitly 
encouraging their children’s comfort with authoritative institutional environments by enrolling 
them in structured, supervised activities (see Weininger and Lareau, 2009). In short, 
nondeclarative and declarative culture are structurally dissociable, as are both of these from public 
culture, and inequality is (partly) a product of this dissociability.  
Emphasizing preferences and automatic cognition as causes of poverty and inequality is 
comforting; doing so allows researchers to maintain a focus on behavioral explanation without 
implicating agency as we typically understand it. Lizardo (2017) inconspicuously redefines race 
and class as “lifestyle-based nondeclarative competences” and conceptualizes inequality as largely 
the result of clashing nondeclarative competences and beliefs; from this perspective, institutions 
would be equally welcoming/hostile to anyone exhibiting lifestyles that correspond/clash with 
their nondeclarative norms. This framework psychologizes the institution—its culture, like 
individual cognition, takes declarative and nondeclarative forms that can be hostile—such that, as 
Ahmed (2012) writes, it can “take the place of individuals” (45) and become “the sick person who 
can be helped by receiving the appropriate treatment” (47). Yet, it is hard to see what the treatment 
would even be since, given that the institution mirrors the individual, its (unwelcoming) culture 
must be largely opaque to it.   
Though the cognitive culturalists frame their approach as a break with commonsense or 
“folk psychology”, it’s hard to see how its application to poverty and inequality differs much from 
theories and empirical research linking various outcomes to so-called non-cognitive, soft, or 
character skills (Heckman and Kautz, 2013); their implications for poverty policy are arguably the 
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same: intervene early, when children form habits and acquire skills. Like Bourdieusean 
sociologists, many workers in the human services believe that insight—for workers, volunteers, 
and clients—comes with a break with routine practices, achieved through training and constant 
reflection on the self (i.e., reflexivity) to create a new disposition or set of habits (Riley, 2017).29 
This perspective drives behavioral modification programs in both philanthropic and penal welfare 
institutions (e.g., Haney, 2010).  
The cognitive culturalists’ approach also bears some disconcerting similarities to the 
argument that cultural adaptations to poverty constitute a self-perpetuating pathology, such that 
changes to people’s economic circumstances or incentive structures would not change their 
outcomes at least not if it is “too late.” The Bourdieusean notion of hysteresis—a mismatch 
between nondeclarative competence, or habitus, and objective circumstances, or field—suggests 
that poor people would not take advantage of beneficial changes in their objective environments 
or circumstances because of durable pre-adjusted habits. This idea is embedded, albeit in less 
flowery terms, in arguments that supplying poor people with more money for food would not 
change their consumption patterns because they have bad taste or a taste for bad things; more 
generally, it is what drives the notion that something other than insufficient material resources 
defines poverty. While some social workers’ and service providers’ focus on habit transformation 
is overdetermined by the structure and funding of their jobs and lack of resources, it is harder to 
 
29 The purpose of Bourdieu’s scholarship, according to Rogers Brubaker, “is not simply to interpret the world; 
it is to change the world, by changing the way in which we—in the first instance, other social scientists—see it” 
(Brubaker, 1993: 217; quoted in Riley, 2017: 120). 
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understand why these sociologists focus on transforming (scientific) consciousness rather than 
transforming social relations.  
1.6 Conclusions 
Over the past ten years the “new” cultural sociologists of poverty have performatively cited 
the narrative that politicized objections to the “culture of poverty” drove cultural sociologists away 
from studying poverty for decades; deriving a kind of “speaker’s benefit” from this narrative, they 
appear not only courageously transgressive but committed to finding the truth at whatever political 
cost. Drawing a symbolic boundary between their “empirical” questions and the “political” 
concerns of their (typically uncited) critics allows the “new” cultural sociologists of poverty to 
obfuscate both empirical work that contradicts their arguments and agenda as well as their own 
ideological dedication to liberalism, most evident in their commitment to studying behavior.  
The “new” cultural sociologists of poverty claim that their attention to meaning-making 
and cultural heterogeneity amongst the poor distances them from “culture of poverty” arguments 
and other unsophisticated positions on the relationship between culture and disadvantage. Yet, 
cultural sociologists are only interested in meaning-making to the extent that they can use it to 
explain behavior and “outcomes” (that are typically behaviors or behaviorally induced) they 
associate with mobility. Their appeals to cultural heterogeneity end up replacing a theory of the 
“culture of poverty” with a theory of the “culture of mobility,” one which relies on the notion of a 
(white) middle-class standard bearer. Despite finding class differences in “outcomes” cultural 
sociologists often find few or no class differences in various measures of culture (e.g., beliefs and 
values).  
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Recently, however, a group of young, prolific cultural sociologists has turned to a typically 
unobserved level of cognition to explain the relationship between outcomes and culture, in some 
ways undermining research that takes “sense-making” as its empirical object. These ‘cognitive 
culturalists’ apply concepts from cognitive science, most prominently the dual process framework, 
to social phenomenon, reinterpreting past studies to account descriptively and theoretically for the 
class-invariance of normative commitments and the disconnect between the latter and behavior. In 
their efforts to integrate concepts from cognitive neuroscience into cultural sociological 
investigations of poverty and inequality, they emphasize the role that automatic cognition plays in 
motivating behavior and producing unequal outcomes. The idea that automatic cognition or 
implicit bias is a principal driver of inequality coheres with a liberal worldview in which the 
(unintentional) behavior of individuals and psychologized institutions produces inequality.  
Though the ‘cognitive culturalists’ present their perspective as a break with commonsense 
“folk psychology,” there is not much to distinguish it from economic research on the effects of 
‘character’ nor certain social service approaches to ‘fixing’ poverty and poor people; all three 
highlight the importance of habits and dispositions in determining economic outcomes. Given the 
concern cultural (and other) sociologists display for their political relevance, they should consider 
the policy implications of the empirical objects they select and the approach they take to 
investigating them. As O’Conner (2001) makes abundantly clear in her masterwork on the history 
of US poverty policy, sociologists, particularly of the cultural variety, have been complicit in, if 
not at the forefront of, policymaking that pathologizes poor people and undermines movements 
for welfare rights. 
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2.0 Poverty Simulations and Feelings as a Vector for Social Change 
2.1 Introduction 
In February 2017, I sat in a high school gymnasium where 65 teachers and staff members 
from East Milltown School District gathered for an in-service training program to learn about the 
life circumstances of people living in poverty. The school district had recently seen a dramatic 
increase in the percentage of its students receiving free and reduced lunch. The District’s 
administration organized this in-service event to encourage its veteran teaching staff to be more 
empathetic in their interactions with poor students and their families. Many of them, the Assistant 
Principal later informed me, hadn’t fully ‘adapted’ to the new students who arrived in East Suburb 
after having been displaced by gentrification in adjacent Milltown City. 
An employee of Milltown Friends for Change, the human service organization facilitating 
the event, had divided the teachers and staff members into small groups and provided them with a 
kit of materials describing the configuration and economic situation of a family living in poverty. 
Rather than simply read these narratives, each of the school personnel was assigned the role of a 
family member and instructed to enact it. The staff were participating in a “poverty simulation,” 
an interactive immersion experience designed to increase awareness, promote social empathy, and 
inspire local change (“The poverty,” n.d.).  
Across the United States (US), the poverty simulation has become an increasingly popular 
event and educational tool for universities, school districts, social service and civil society 
organizations, and businesses. Though their specific reasons for arranging simulations are 
different, all these contexts share an assumption that “walking in the shoes” of imagined poor 
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people produces a form of social feeling that is a vector for individual and social/community 
change. Similar assumptions underlie related events that have cropped up in the past two decades, 
including “Forced from Home”, a simulation of a refugee camp created by the nongovernmental 
organization Doctors Without Borders, and the “Caminata Noctura,” a border-crossing simulation 
designed by entrepreneurs in the Mexican town of El Alberto.  
Recent improvements in virtual reality (VR) technologies have also expanded 
opportunities to develop immersive virtual environments that aim to induce empathy, change 
behavior, and, ultimately, stimulate social change. The United Nations has a VR series designed 
to “bring the world’s most pressing challenges home to decision makers and global citizens around 
the world, pushing the bounds of empathy” and Stanford University’s Virtual-Human Interaction 
lab has a project that enables participants to “viscerally embody an avatar” who encounters 
different forms of racism and sexism; the National Football League (NFL) is using it as a diversity 
training tool.30  
 
30 The applications of VR as a tool for tackling social problems (via empathy-based individual 
behavioral/psychological change) will likely continue to grow as VR headsets become cheaper and more widespread. 
In addition to discrimination based on racism and sexism, technologists have developed environments that enable 
people to simulate the experience of being date raped, homeless, and forcibly displaced. In an interview with Wired 
magazine, Palmer Luckey, the founder of Oculus Rift, the most well-known VR company, has suggested that making 
VR pervasive is a “moral imperative” because “everyone wants to have a happy life, but it’s going to be impossible 
to give everyone everything they want…Virtual reality can make it so anyone, anywhere can have these experiences” 
(Au 2016). In Luckey’s vision for the future, we will use VR not only to reduce the biases of the relatively privileged 
but to artificially improve the lived experiences of the relatively disadvantaged.  
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Together, these events and technologies form an instructive social phenomenon for 
thinking about how organizations and communities conceptualize, explain, and address poverty 
and other ‘social problems’. In the US and elsewhere, behavioralist explanations for poverty, 
driven by social scientific analyses of individual-level variables and ‘ghetto culture’, legitimize 
the state’s enforcement of work and the sexual contract through social welfare policy (Kelley, 
1997; O’Connor 2001; Cooper 2017). Researchers have demonstrated the ways that the state and 
its surrogates attempt to modify the behavior and desires of poor people using a variety of 
disciplinary, penal, and therapeutic technologies (e.g., Soss et al, 2011; Piven and Cloward, 1993; 
Haney 2010; Polsky 1993). But what about the events and technologies organizations use to 
modify the habitus of employees the state gives contracts and expects to work on and engage ‘the 
poor’? How do these events and technologies theorize the connections among their emotions, 
attitudes, knowledge, behavior, and social change?  
In this article, rather than evaluate the effectiveness of the poverty simulation in generating 
social feeling and increasing participants’ structural attributions for poverty, I take the simulation 
and organizers’ and facilitators’ evaluations and expectations of it as my empirical objects. By 
researching the professionals and organizations that promote poverty simulations and related 
activities to public and private entities, I explore how this increasingly common simulation idiom 
works as an approach to social problem engagement. I ask why organizers and facilitators see 
certain emotions as a route to social change and why the simulation is so marketable now as a tool 
for development and transformation. In focusing on the cultural frames of professionals whose job 
is to respond and/or train people to respond to poor people, I attempt to help broaden the sociology 
of poverty’s field of vision beyond what Rodríguez-Muñiz (2015: 104) refers to as its “myopic 
fixture on the poor” and their lifeworlds.  
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I begin by explaining the history, design, and uses of the poverty simulation. After 
describing my data and methods, I situate the poverty simulation in relation to Hoffman’s (2006; 
2007; 2016) theorizing of simulations as social processes within organizations and compare it to 
other events and technologies with substantive or tactical similarities. Based on participant-
observation at poverty simulations and meetings where they were planned, content analysis of 
materials used to facilitate poverty simulations, and interviews with facilitators, I make three 
specific claims.  
First, simulation facilitators frame poverty (and, implicitly, other social problems) as 
something you have to feel to understand and cast traditional methods of teaching and learning 
about poverty (usually via “numbers” and “statistics”) as inadequate, unconvincing, and 
susceptible to cynicism. I suggest that facilitators are guided by a trust in feelings that departs from 
a trust in numbers usually associated with expert knowledge. Second, facilitators trust specifically 
in feelings with a negative valence and high arousal value, which they see as accurate and therefore 
believable replicas of the feelings experienced by people living in poverty. I argue that facilitators 
share an elemental conviction that suffering produces a form of understanding that is corrective. 
Third, for facilitators and organizers the simulation (and the feelings it inspires) is an alternative 
route to social change that does not involve the contention and confrontation typically associated 
with the ‘political’. I conclude that as VR technology becomes better and cheaper these 
“simulations for social change” are likely to become more and more common in educational, work, 
and civic organizations and everyday life. I briefly outline some questions and approaches that 
sociologists who study poverty, social problems, and civic engagement can take to researching and 
theorizing them.  
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2.2 What Is A Poverty Simulation?  
The original poverty simulation was a “welfare simulation” designed by the Reform 
Organization of Welfare (ROWEL) in the late 1970s. ROWEL, a group of Missourian religious 
leaders and lay persons that formed in 1972 in the wake of cuts to entitlement programs, created 
the simulation to train church members as “lay lobbyists” for increases in means-tested income 
transfers, most notably Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), in the Missouri State 
Capitol. In 2002, ROWEL sold the copyright for its simulation kit to the Missouri Association for 
Community Action, now known as the Missouri Community Action Network (MCAN). MCAN 
renamed the kit “The Community Action Poverty Simulation” and revised its contents to “reflect 
the families that have been served by community action” (thepovertysimulation.net), many of 
which, as the simulation facilitators’ guide indicates, “do not, technically speaking, fall below the 
poverty line. Rather, they typify the average or vast majority of low-income homes.” 
MCAN is an association of Missouri-based Community Action Agencies (CAAs), which 
are nonprofit organizations and public agencies established under the Economic Opportunity Act 
of 1964 to fight America’s War on Poverty by enlisting the “maximum feasible participation” of 
poor people in determining what would help them become self-sufficient. CAAs were formative 
sites for local activists and provided jobs to low-income residents and spaces for them to organize 
and launch campaigns demanding services and resources from the state (Naples 2014). The success 
of CAAs in eliciting poor people’s activism and participation prompted white backlash and 
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opposition from big city political machines, which in 1967 lobbied successfully for legislation 
limiting poor people’s control over CAAs (Cazenave, 2007; see also O’Connor, 2001).31   
When Nixon became president in 1970, he appointed Donald Rumsfeld as Director of the 
Office of Economic Opportunity, then the funding body for CAAs. Rumsfeld issued an instruction 
stating that the “primary catalytic mission” of the CAA was “to make the entire community more 
responsive to the needs and interests of the poor” and that, more important than the services it 
provides, its success is measured “by the improvements and changes it achieves in the community’s 
attitudes and practices toward the poor and in the allocation and focusing of public and private 
resources” (quoted in Bunch and Wang, 2016: 156; emphasis mine). No longer driven by the will 
of poor activists, CAAs were directed to focus on changing beliefs and actions and developing 
more efficient uses of dwindling public monies, rather than challenging existing power 
arrangements and patronage systems. The poverty simulation is a tool that CAAs and affiliated 
organizations use to fulfill this mission, which remains central to their work. For some 
organizations, like MCAN and Friends for Change, the poverty simulation is also a way to recruit 
volunteers and generate revenue in increasingly competitive markets for public and private 
monies.32 
 
31 Congress passed a pair of amendments in 1967 that gave local elected officials the authority to select the 
official CAA for their district (Green Amendment) and stipulated that 1/3 of the seats of every CAA’s board had to 
be given to elected officials and 1/3 to private sector representatives, leaving 1/3 of seats to represent the “maximum 
feasible participation” of poor people (Quie Amendment). 
32 Like wages, funding for CAAs remained flat or below inflation throughout the 1970s, and in 1981, under 
the Reagan Administration, Congress authorized the Community Service Block Grant, which consolidated, devolved, 
and reduced funding for anti-poverty programs, including CAAs. Since MCAN acquired the poverty simulation in 
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Except for some tables, chairs, and a large room, the materials required for the poverty 
simulation come in a sophisticated kit that fills a 50-gallon rolling plastic storage trunk. In addition 
to the role descriptions discussed below, the kit includes a director’s manual, a media guide, sample 
press releases, a fact sheet about poverty in the US, and a list of suggestions for “what you can do” 
to end poverty.  
As participants enter the simulation space, which represents the “community,” the 
facilitator randomly assigns them to one of 26 families and directs them to the middle of the 
“community” where they find and take a seat at the group of chairs designated by a sign indicating 
their family name. Each family receives a packet of information including a description of family 
members; a brief backstory that intimates why the family became poor; a list of the family’s 
sources of income, possessions, and bills; identification documents; play money; and 
transportation passes. Each family profile falls into one of nine categories: recently unemployed; 
applying for social services and employment; single, living in homeless shelter; single, living with 
partner and child; employed, receiving food stamps; employed; receiving retirement, living in a 
homeless shelter; receiving retirement, living alone; and grandparents raising children. The 
 
2002, the poverty simulation has proved a major success and become an important source of income for MCAN; in 
2016, sales of poverty simulation kits ($2,000 each) and two-day facilitator trainings ($410 per person) generated 
$236,525 in revenue, or 14 percent of total revenue and over 25 percent of the amount given to the organization 
through government grants. MCAN maintains a separate website for the poverty simulation and employs a full-time 
poverty simulation manager to oversee the materials and trainings. Facilitators, like Friends for Change, also make 
money from the poverty simulation; East Suburb School District paid $1,200 for its staff to immerse themselves in 
the narratives of MCAN’s clients.   
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backstories correspond to these categories, such that, for example, all “grandparents raising 
children” are doing so because their “daughter was incarcerated for drug use.” 
Surrounding the families, which together compose the “neighborhood,” are “community 
services,” long tables that represent the resources available to poor families, including a bank, 
pawn shop, employer, school, utility company, landlord, police station, and community action 
agency, among others. Volunteers staff the community resource tables and perform the tasks 
associated with their role; the employer, for example, clocks workers in and out of work, writes 
paychecks, and hires and fires people. Using these resources, participants must “try to walk a mile 
in the shoes of those who are poor” (Facilitator’s Guide) for four fifteen-minute “weeks,” the 
beginning and end of which are marked by the facilitator’s whistle.   
Ideally, and per the instructions MCAN includes with the simulation, all or at least most 
volunteers staffing the resource tables should be people who are currently poor or have experienced 
“poverty situations.” MCAN describes their participation as “an essential ingredient” and directs 
the facilitators and organizers to “emphasize that the simulation is an opportunity for low-income 
people to educate the simulation participants; and to assure them that the intent is not putting them 
on display.” Involving “low-income people” in the simulation is a kind of minimum-feasible 
participation. Yet, poor people did not make-up the majority of volunteer staffers at any of the 
poverty simulations I attended during my fieldwork. And, per my interviews with facilitators, the 
volunteers at most poverty simulations are not clients but rather service providers and/or people 
who regularly volunteer with the community organizations sponsoring the event.   
The simulation, which lasts about 70 minutes, is followed by small group discussions that 
are dominated by a kind of collective emotion work that is less about managing feelings to maintain 
relationships or influence impressions and more about publicizing feelings to affirm their 
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generative potential for change and insight. This form of emotion work does not arise 
spontaneously but is deliberately evoked by the list of discussion questions supplied by MCAN. 
These questions are one explicit manifestation of the ‘feeling rules’ of the simulation, i.e., the 
expectations that guide participants’ processes of emotion management (Hochschild 1983/2012). 
The first question focuses on what ‘families’ accomplished (e.g., pay the rent; keep utilities on; 
buy food), what they did in the process (e.g., neglect their children; cheat, steal, or do something 
else illegal; help each other), and what happened to them (e.g., eviction). The discussion guide 
then asks participants to compare the outcomes of their families; to describe the feelings they 
experienced, the way they felt about themselves, and why; to share how they felt about the way 
other people responded to their needs; to explain whether and how their attitudes changed; and to 
state the conclusions and/or insights they were able to draw about the ‘life experiences of low-
income families.’ Steered by the questions, discussions begin with reports of what objectively 
happened, move to emotional reflections, and end with considerations of attitudinal change and 
statements about the lives of poor people. Conclusions about poverty follow from feelings about 
rather than reports of what happened. The fact that one was evicted, for example, matters less for 
drawing conclusions about poverty than how one feels about having been evicted. 
A wide variety of public, private, and third sector organizations host and participate in 
poverty simulations to ‘raise awareness’ about poverty. Setting aside, for the moment, the question 
of what it means to ‘raise awareness’ about something that most people in the US will experience 
at some point in their lives (Rank, 2011; Rank and Hirschl, 2015), the purpose of this immersive 
approach to awareness-raising varies by organization. School districts, professional schools, social 
service agencies, non-profit groups, customer service companies, and programs like Teach for 
America and AmeriCorps use the simulation as professional development, i.e., as something that 
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will improve workers’ and/or volunteers’ skills. Corporations use it for teambuilding and customer 
service training.  
2.3 Data and Methods 
The arguments I elaborate here are based on data I gathered through semi-structured 
interviews with poverty simulation facilitators; content analysis of poverty simulation materials 
and academic and popular articles about them; and participant observation at poverty simulations 
and meetings where they were planned. I participated in six poverty simulations in and around a 
Rust Belt city I pseudonymously refer to as Milltown City. Three of the simulations took place at 
institutes of higher education (one community college; one private university; and one state 
university); and the other three took place in a suburban school district; church; and community 
center. At all the simulations, I took the role of either employer or pawn shop owner, which are 
two of the busiest community resources in the simulation. I also facilitated small group discussions 
after the simulations, which provided insight into participants’ reflections on the simulation. 
Finally, I conducted informal interviews with participants before and after the simulations. 
During my fieldwork, I was employed as a volunteer coordinator at Milltown Friends for 
Change, a chapter of a national anti-poverty human services organization that hosts poverty 
simulations to recruit volunteers for its programming. My employment there afforded me access 
to meetings where facilitators and host organizations planned and discussed poverty simulations 
and to the poverty simulation materials, which as I note above are quite costly.   
I conducted semi-structured interviews with 15 poverty simulation facilitators, 12 of whom 
were part of the Friends for Change network. The three other facilitators worked for other human 
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service organizations and were recommended to me by Friends for Change facilitators. Three of 
the facilitators are Black women; six are white women; and six are white men. I did not find any 
significant differences between the responses of facilitators who worked for Friends for Change 
and those who worked for other organizations. Interviews lasted between one and two hours and 
were transcribed verbatim.  
I conducted the interviews after having participated in several poverty simulations and my 
questions were grounded in descriptive and then focused coding of my fieldnotes, which 
highlighted the centrality of feelings and community to the poverty simulation as an event. I then 
coded the interview data according to hypotheses I developed as a participant-observer, focusing 
on facilitators’ descriptions of the simulation’s purpose and their explanations of how it works.  
2.4 The Poverty Simulation as Social Process 
Hoffman (2007) theorizes simulations as social processes within organizations that vary 
across three dimensions: (i) whether they have a predominantly virtual or physical interface 
(experiential modality); (ii) how realistic participants perceive them to be (perceived realism); (iii) 
whether they pre-enact a future situation as a means of training or, in contrast, reenact a scenario 
or generate a self-referential process (referential frame). Organizations use simulations to manage 
risks and uncertainty, create experiences that are otherwise practically or ethically out of bounds, 
and/or provide substitute information where empirical data are missing or prohibited, usually for 
the ultimate purpose of preparation or knowledge production.  
Many organizations use the poverty simulation to provide an otherwise practically 
unavailable experience to participants who are preparing or training for roles, events, and situations 
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where they will regularly interact with people living in poverty. As with traditional preparative or 
task-focused simulations (e.g., CPR trainings or military field exercises), the poverty simulation 
has a physical interface and its effectiveness depends on participants’ sharing an interpretive 
agreement that the activities they perform approximate some indexed reality of poverty. Unlike 
traditional task preparation simulations, in which participants repeatedly simulate activities and 
roles they will perform in some future higher-risk scenario, participants in the poverty 
simulation—those who take on the roles of poor families—are not likely to participate more than 
once33 and do not perform a role they anticipate holding in the future.34  
Though participants are often preparing for scenarios approximated by the poverty 
simulation, such as interactions with poor clients or students, they play a role for which they are 
not training and experiment with skills—namely, those necessary for survival in simulated poverty 
conditions—they do not personally need in the present35 or imagined future. Instead of learning 
by doing, participants in the poverty simulation learn by feeling. Put differently, while the learning 
in most preparative simulations—from flight simulators to sparring sessions to concert 
 
33 This characteristic also distinguishes poverty simulations from fantasy role-playing games (Fine 1983). 
34 It may, however, be a role they hold at the time of the poverty simulation. The poverty simulation is 
especially popular in colleges and universities. While dominant beliefs hold that university students are uniformly 
privileged, recent research by Sara Goldrick-Rab (2016) shows that students from poor families do not cease to be 
affected by poverty upon entering colleges and universities; instead, many of these students face homelessness and 
hunger and the overwhelming majority of them are unable to graduate within 5 years, if at all, due to a lack of material 
resources.  
35 Again, this assumes that participants are not living in poverty. It is probably fair to say, though, that poor 
and working-class participants likely already possess the skills with which middle-class participants are 
experimenting.  
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rehearsals—is practical (Wacquant 2006), the learning in the poverty simulation is experiential 
and emotional. Yet, facilitators and organizers hope and expect that the experience will affect 
practices, those routine embodied activities that enable people to do certain things and think of 
themselves in certain ways.  
Standardized patient programs within medical education and certification share with the 
poverty simulation an interactive format and a purpose of engendering empathy, and for this reason 
serve as a good point of comparison. In standardized patient programs, trained actors simulate 
patients with common symptoms and medical students interview them, trying to diagnose their 
underlying condition, typically in front of the latter’s peers and instructors. Following the 
interaction, the actors evaluate the students’ performance, including whether they voiced empathy 
and expressed compassion. Setting aside questions about the connections between concerns about 
doctors’ affect and the commodification of health care, standardized patient programs are premised 
on the notion that less judgmental, more empathic doctors are better able to elicit information that 
aids diagnosis and treatment. Medical students practice empathy and non-judgment by interacting 
with simulated patients, not by simulating the patients themselves.  
The author Leslie Jamison writes in an essay on her experiences as a medical actor that the 
motions of standardized patient programs are an implicit “acknowledgement of effort” that “chafes 
against the notion that empathy should always rise unbidden, that genuine means the same thing 
as unwilled, that intentionality is the enemy of love” (2014). The poverty simulation also admits 
that social feeling for poor people is not an impulse; in fact, it begins from the position that most 
people’s impulse is to judge and condescend to poor people. But, the corrective for this impulsive 
deficit or dysfunction is neither discipline—it is not solely a matter of practice—nor education—
no amount of reading or studying suffices—but momentous experience. As I argue below, for the 
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poverty simulation experience to be momentous, for it to be ‘eye-opening’ as facilitators, 
participants, and journalists often describe it, participants must a) feel emotions with a negative 
valence and high arousal value and b) believe that those feelings are actually how people in poverty 
feel in everyday life.  
2.5 You Have to Feel It to Believe It 
In interviews and academic evaluations, simulation facilitators and organizers routinely 
claim that for people to ‘really’ or ‘truly’ understand poverty, they need to experience and feel 
what it is like to be poor. From their perspective, traditional means of presenting and learning 
information about poverty (i.e., via facts and statistics) are insufficient for generating the deeper 
awareness necessary to combat stereotypes and, when participants are preparing to work on/with 
poor people, provide services effectively. Facilitators view numbers as less compelling than 
feelings and dismiss or downplay the traditional appeal of quantification as a technology that 
“minimizes the need for intimate knowledge and personal trust” (Porter, 1996: ix) and “provides 
a basis for agreement among people who otherwise have little in common” (Davies, 2018). 
Whereas most of the academic and applied training that professionals (and oftentimes volunteers) 
receive encourages them to detach their feelings from their observations of and behavior towards 
clients, patients, or students—the strategic maintenance of emotional and physical boundaries is 
central to the ethics of most interpersonal service work—the poverty simulation encourages them 
to reattach (certain) feelings to observations. In place of a discourse of numbers, which 
professionals use to avoid the appearance of judgement and partiality, simulation facilitators 
  61 
substitute a discourse of feeling, which, interestingly, they also associate with the exclusion of 
judgment and the formation of common ground. 
Simulation facilitators view ‘facts’ and discussion as inadequate to the task of changing 
people’s minds about poverty. In a 2011 Teaching Sociology article, for example, Steck and 
colleagues conclude, based on their students’ reflections on the poverty simulation, that while 
showing students poverty statistics and trends gives them “a solid knowledge base on the number 
and proportion of Americans living below the poverty line…an exclusive reliance on ‘the facts’ 
fails to challenge students’ underlying assumptions and stereotypes about why people are poor” 
(270). This sentiment is echoed by facilitators and organizers in press coverage of poverty 
simulations. At Wright State University, where all first-year medical students are required to 
participate in the poverty simulation, the professor who organized it explained to a reporter that 
“having students play the role of a family member in poverty is a more effective way to illustrate 
the pervasive impact of significant financial stress than simply talking about it” (Mihalek, 2018). 
The notion that the poverty simulation is a more compelling and effective than traditional 
strategies for teaching people about poverty was expressed by my interview respondents. John, a 
white man in his late 30s who is the assistant principal of a local high school in a school district 
that organized a poverty simulation for its teachers and staff, explained to me what the poverty 
simulation does that “reading a book or just learning about [poverty]” does not. He said that he felt 
“a sense of anxiousness” that “gave me that feeling like, if I was living in this situation, I would 
be anxious too.” The anxiety, furthermore, drove him and his ‘family’ to behave unscrupulously 
within the simulation. “And almost toward the end of the simulation we became desperate,” he 
said, “like we tried to do some things to make ends meet that probably were unethical but that’s 
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just how we felt in that simulation…you know, I felt anxious, and I felt desperate, and I don’t 
really remember a book doing that for me.”  
Echoing John, Jennifer, a black woman in her early 40s who directs community education 
for a large network of foodbanks and has facilitated hundreds of poverty simulations for a broad 
range of organizations, clarified to me the difference between reading about and ‘experiencing’ 
poverty: 
I mean, reading increases your knowledge; it gives you some 
facts…If you’re an open-minded person, it may make you want to 
do more research about a particular area that you did your reading 
about. A poverty simulation actually [makes] you experience 
stress…reading it’s just me internalizing a document or a book. 
Where a poverty simulation you experience with other people, like 
having that time to really be able to experience your body going 
through the emotions of somebody who is stressed. 
Jennifer suggests that whereas factual knowledge can be convincing to people who are 
‘open-minded,’ the simulation idiom is more broadly applicable because it engages people’s 
feelings in a group setting. The pervasive sense of anxiety and stress generated by the shared 
experience of the poverty simulation—feelings that in the next section I will show are purposefully 
conjured by its facilitators—provides a way for facilitators to engage people who are not initially 
(i.e., before the simulation) ‘open-minded’ in discussions of poverty.  
While the emotional experience Jennifer describes is intense and disturbing, the simulation 
that elicits it is, according to Jennifer, a “non-threatening” way to engage people in difficult 
conversations. Jennifer explained that if she began a conversation by saying that poor people are 
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not lazy, “people will have a lot of debate or unwillingness” to talk to her. The poverty simulation, 
in contrast, gives people an experience that they can talk about; “if you’ve experienced something,” 
she said, “you’re more likely to want to discuss it.” Jennifer was the first facilitator I interviewed, 
and in subsequent interviews I asked facilitators whether they agreed with Jennifer’s assessment 
of the simulation of the assessment as “non-threatening”; all but one did. The facilitator who 
disagreed only did so partially, stating that the “shared experience reduces some of the threat to a 
point, but it is such a stressful, frustrating, fearful experience.” 
My ethnographic observations largely support the facilitators’ understanding of the 
simulation, and the common emotional experience it produces, as “non-threatening” or conflict-
avoidant; it is a method of civil engagement. I did not witness a single argument at any of the 
simulations in which I participated. Even in the small group discussions that I helped facilitate 
following simulations, there was no debate, only mutual affirmation of emotional response. This 
is not to say that participants did not have conflicting reactions to the simulation, only that their 
reactions never manifested in open contention. At one simulation that was mandatory for 
undergraduate social work students, for example, I saw a young black woman whisper “that’s so 
stupid” to herself in response to a young white woman’s comment that the simulation demonstrates 
why “we need to encourage community gardening” to bring people together and teach them how 
to feed themselves. As I describe in the following sections, facilitators value the simulation not 
only because it helps them raise awareness and recruit volunteers but also because its focus on 
certain feelings allows them to avoid conflict, or at least keep it sotto voce, and, in so doing, avoid 
politics. 
The simulation instantiates a common sense that poverty needs to be felt to be understood; 
reading is not sufficient, nor is listening to a lecture. Yet, for most facilitators, only certain 
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emotional states have value for inspiring social action, specifically those that are unpleasant with 
a high arousal value. Despite their association with poverty, emotions like boredom and loneliness, 
unpleasant states with low arousal value, are intentionally not drawn out by the poverty simulation.  
At a network meeting of Milltown City Friends for Change, Sherryl, a Site Coordinator, 
talked about wanting to incorporate people who work in social services into the debriefing 
component of the poverty simulation. She wanted these people, presumably experts, to more 
formally explain to simulation participants what it is like to use social services. George, the paid 
program evaluator and a former Site Coordinator, countered with one ‘finding’ of his evaluation: 
middle-class volunteers really like the poverty simulation for its experiential and distressing 
qualities, which leave a lasting impression on them. He suggested that Sherryl shouldn’t tamper 
with the simulation because subjecting potential future volunteers to lectures from social workers 
and other social service personnel could detract from their disintermediated experience. He noted 
that for middle-class volunteers, the simulation is a reprieve from their typically rational and 
logical approach to social issues. Sherryl, a black woman in her forties who grew-up in a poor 
household and survived periods of homelessness, replied that George’s response is ‘really funny’ 
because ‘poor people are lectured all the time.’ 
For facilitators like Jennifer and George, immersive experience is more compelling and 
effective than traditional strategies for teaching people about poverty because people often view 
the latter as biased or boring. As Steck and colleagues contend, “assertions by an instructor 
regarding the structural inequalities and unique difficulties faced by those in poverty may fall flat 
or be perceived as naïve or biased by the students” (2011: 270). The poverty simulation transforms 
incredulous participants into believers by making them feelers first, advancing an empiricst 
understanding of truth. Yet, Sherryl’s reply to George’s rejection of her adjustment to the 
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simulation—that it’s really funny because poor people are lectured all the time—is a frank 
commentary on the limits of immersive representation. Being lectured is, as Sherryl points out, 
something poor people experience all the time. Yet, this component of their everyday lives—in 
addition to experiences of joy, pleasure, or ennui—is not part of the simulation experience. In the 
following section, I suggest that facilitators’ emphasis on pain is based on an implicit model of 
social action wherein pain begets corrective understanding begets vaguely-defined involvement. 
2.6 Feeling Bad to Better Feel 
Lauren Berlant (1999) argues that belief in ‘national sentimentality’— “a rhetoric of 
promise that a nation can be built across fields of social difference through channels of affective 
identification and empathy” (53)— suffuses (identity) politics in the US. She contends that 
minoritized groups often use sentimentality and trauma to try to achieve social change by 
encouraging “classically privileged national subjects” (e.g., middle-class Whites) to “feel the pain 
of flawed or denied citizenship as their pain” (ibid). This affective tactic of the dispossessed 
should, theoretically, lead those with power to do whatever they can to eradicate the pain with 
which they now identify, eventuating structural transformation and reauthorizing the national 
collectivity premised on the notion that we are all alike because we can all experience pain, “a 
universal true feeling” (ibid.; see also Berlant, 2008).  Berlant contends that this ‘politics of true 
feeling’ advances the untenable claim that trauma only produces clarity—that feeling bad is 
reliable evidence of injustice—and creates a “sense that changes in feeling, even on a mass scale, 
amount to substantial social change” (1999: 54). “What does it mean,” she asks, “for the theory 
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and practice of social transformation when feeling good becomes evidence of justice’s triumph?” 
(1999: 58, emphasis in original).  
The poverty simulation and its facilitators traffic in a sentimental politics similar to the one 
Berlant theorizes and critiques. Facilitators emphasize the importance of participants experiencing 
psychological pain in the form of anxiety, stress, and frustration as a means of understanding the 
reality of poverty. They seek to heighten the possibility that middle-class participants will identify 
with the pain of poor people by adjusting the simulation to make it more difficult and therefore, 
from their perspective, more accurate or truthful. They assume hopefully that this process of 
identification and subsequent heightened awareness will lead participants to act in some way to 
alleviate poor people’s pain.  
There are a couple of slight differences between the discourse of sentimentality Berlant 
describes and the poverty simulation. Although poverty simulation facilitators believe in the power 
of the experience of pain to provide participants with clarity and higher understanding, they do not 
necessarily believe that experiencing poverty in real life is enlightening. Instead, they think that 
real life poverty is traumatic, preventing people from thinking clearly about the long-term 
consequences of their actions and leading them to, as one facilitator expressed, “live in the tyranny 
of the moment”—in the language of development economics, that poverty shortens people’s ‘time 
horizons’ and produces a ‘present-bias’. By having an embodied experience of anxiety and turmoil, 
simulation participants achieve clarity on why poor people make the (bad/impatient) decisions that 
they do. Furthermore, whereas in the feeling culture created by national sentimentality feeling 
better is evidence that things are better, in the feeling culture of the poverty simulation feeling bad 
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is evidence that one can and will better feel.36 That is, facilitators hope and believe that the acute, 
distressing feelings participants experience in the simulation will lead them to adjust their emotion 
work, to be better at feeling.  
The poverty simulation thus addresses both the more cognitive and affective aspects of 
what Weber (YEAR) called ‘the problem of meaning’, i.e., the absence of inherent significance to 
the order of the world and, especially, human suffering in it (see Geertz 1973). The poverty 
simulation is pedagogical for participants, giving them an analytic vocabulary in which to 
understand the experience of poverty and relate it to poor people’s behavior and an emotional one 
in which to express their feelings in a manner that complements the tenor of poor people’s 
experiences; it teaches participants not how to avoid feeling pain, nor really how to help others to 
avoid feeling pain, but rather how to feel about others’ pain (ibid.).  
The feeling rules of the simulation—the expectations that guide participants’ processes of 
emotion management (Hochschild 1983/2003)—are conveyed implicitly through the structure of 
the simulation and explicitly by the facilitator. The simulation is designed to elicit gradually 
negative valence and high arousal affective states, like distress or frustration. Participants appear 
calm as they meet and chat with their new ‘families,’ sometimes laughing at family members 
impersonating assigned roles that are incongruous with their age and/or gender identity, like one 
man in his early twenties I saw unconvincingly act the part of a twelve-year-old girl, tugging on 
his Mom’s sleeve asking when they were going shopping. Reading from the guide supplied by 
MCAN, the facilitator reminds the participants, “This is a simulation, not a game. You may be 
 
36 Feeling bad can also be evidence that one is good, e.g., white people’s declarations of their white privilege 
involve a pride in feeling shame (see Ahmed, 2005).  
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tempted to treat this as a game…the situations we use are real, based on real-life experiences of 
families with low-income.” The entreaty not to treat the simulation as a game is a plea to take it 
seriously—to not enjoy it too much or at least not in a frivolous or mirthful manner. Middle-class 
participants should not completely enjoy the simulation experience because the lives of poor 
people are not enjoyable; they are, in the simulation, devoid of pleasure and full of responsibility. 
For the poverty simulation to be, as advertised, a “profoundly moving experience” that “moves 
people to think about the harsh realities of poverty and…most importantly…to make a 
difference,” participants must feel frustrated, stressed, and thwarted.37  
 
37 Representations of poverty as a struggle run counter to the reactionary rhetoric that social welfare programs 
enable poor people to lead lives of indulgence and leisure, perversely reinforcing dependence and the social 
pathologies of poverty (on rhetorics of reaction see Hirschman 1991; Somers and Block 2005). The Heritage 
Foundation’s 2011 report, “Air Conditioning, Cable TV, and an Xbox: What is Poverty in the United States Today?” 
is an archetype of this kind of reactionary rhetoric. Its three “key takeaways” are that the typical poor family 1) has a 
car, air conditioning, two color televisions, cable or satellite television, a DVD player, and a VCR; 2) is not hungry 
and is able to obtain medical care; 3) has more living space that the average non-poor European.  
The image of the excessive and indulgent welfare recipient is both racialized and gendered, narratively 
embodied by the “welfare queen,” a dog-whistle caricature fabricated by the 1976 Reagan campaign to delegitimize 
progressive redistribution, justify increased surveillance, and bolster (patriarchal) family values (Soss et al. 2011; 
Cooper 2017). The myth of the welfare queen—with her lobster, pearls, and pink Cadillac—is hidden-in-plain-sight 
in the discourse of the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (Schram 2000) as well 
as more recent state laws like Kansas’ HOPE Act, which makes it illegal to spend public assistance on jewelry, lingerie, 
and spa treatments among other (feminine) goods and activities.  
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When the whistle blows marking the start of the first week, most participants meander, 
sauntering to work, or school, or social services, or the pawn shop. They arrive to their destinations 
often having forgotten that they need ‘bus tickets’ to get there, forcing them to either return to their 
‘home’ where they keep their bus tickets or find the family member who has them. Leaving one’s 
belongings at home—money, food stamps, pawnable items—runs the risk of having them stolen 
by the ‘illegal activities person,’ who is largely absent during the first ‘week’ of the simulation but 
as time goes on ups the ante, sometimes recruiting ‘teenagers’ into his (I never saw a woman 
assigned this role) ‘drug ring.’ This may sound ridiculous, but because participants are told from 
the get-go that the simulation is not a game, and because they know—or know that they are 
supposed to know—that poverty is a serious issue, most of them simulate soberly from the start 
and almost all of them do by the start of the second week.  
Participants’ solemn approach to the simulation increases the likelihood that they will 
become more and more distressed and harried as the simulation moves forward, which recursively 
enhances participants’ seriousness. When the whistle blows at the start of the second ‘week’, 
participants no longer amble to their destinations; they barely smile and walk briskly with bus 
tickets in hand, aiming to be the first in line to pay their utility bills or rent, apply for or receive 
food stamps, or interview for a job at the only company that is hiring. By the start of the third 
week, participants are even more fleet-footed, many of them jogging impatiently to accomplish 
their tasks, occasionally trying to muscle others out of line or growing visibly frustrated when 
things move slowly, or they are not able to get what they want. At this point of the simulation at 
East Milltown School District, a participant frenziedly approached the table where I, the town 
landlord, sat with Joanne, the utility bill collector. Joanne had delivered a shut-off notice to the 
participant, who in real life was a white teacher in her fifties, and she had come to pay her electric 
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bill. Following the instructions that come with the kit, which, like real life, punishes you for being 
poor, Joanne assessed her a fifty-dollar fee to have the utilities turned back-on. The participant did 
not have the additional fifty dollars, so she grabbed her bus ticket out of Joanne’s hand and ran 
away, at which point Joanne went to the police to have her arrested for theft. Tense interactions 
and ‘illegal activities’ are even more common in the fourth and final week of the simulation, when 
jogging becomes running, or sprinting for the spry, and participants scramble to end the month in 
or closer to the black. 
Although the basic design of the poverty simulation—the condensed amount of time, 
penalties for defaulting on bills and rent, the cost of transportation—makes it difficult to 
accomplish tasks necessary for individual and familial survival, facilitators often adjust it to make 
it more distressing and, thus, from their perspective, closer to reality. At Friends for Change’s 
national conference, Mary, the executive director of a human services organization in the 
Southeastern US, gave a workshop on how to facilitate a successful poverty simulation. An 
energetic white woman in her early fifties, Mary explained to the audience of about 20 program 
directors, all but one of whom were women, that the most important thing to do to make a poverty 
simulation effective is to “adapt it to your community…to put those little things in it to make it a 
little more accurate.”  
Facilitators make a range of difficulty-enhancing adjustments and adaptations to the 
simulation, from shortening the duration of the ‘weeks’ to closing the community resources 
unexpectedly to coaching volunteers to be mean and deceitful in their interactions with 
participants. At a poverty simulation Mary facilitated for an “extremely white” homeschooling 
program, for example, when a “homeschooling kid” tried to pawn his family’s television, the shop 
owner told him she had enough televisions but offered him a deal: “Tell you what. Do you want 
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to come back here and do something strange for some change?” “And she’s like this tall and this 
wide,” Mary explained to us, gesticulating the shop owner’s large dimensions with her hands, “a 
black woman and he’s like this little guy and he turned like sheet white and I thought he was going 
to throw up… And a lot of them don't quite catch on at first and I had one woman…I mean she 
was about my age and she was bursting into tears. And she went, ‘Oh my gosh, that's how it 
happens.’ It was like the first time in her life that she thought, ‘people don't get up and sell 
themselves for fun.’”  
Mary, an expert in poverty simulation facilitation responsible for training a group of twenty 
other facilitators, made a clear connection between the fear and pain that the woman experienced 
and her ‘enlightenment’, expressed in her realization that poor people would not choose to become 
sex workers if they had other options available to them.38 In the discussions that follow the 
simulation, facilitators educe from participants connections between the suffering they 
experienced and the bad and/or negligent decisions they made, hoping that this connection will 
 
38 There is an ongoing debate among feminist scholars and activists about whether people (typically women) 
can consent to or actively choose sex work. I will not venture too deeply into this debate here, but, briefly, those who 
argue in the negative, sometimes referred to as ‘Radical Feminists’ or ‘Abolitionist Feminists,’ argue that all sex work 
is oppressive and objectifying and should be outlawed. At their most extreme, they contend that women cannot 
meaningfully consent to commodified or even non-commodified heterosexual sex under conditions of patriarchy. On 
the other side of the debate are feminists who take the liberal position that the right to bodily autonomy includes the 
right to provide sexual services in exchange for money and draw a hard line between sex work and sex trafficking. 
Mary’s variation on the simulation used sexualized shame to place some participants in a distressing situation that 
prompted a reaction of definitive understanding that poor women do not elect freely to engage in sex work and 
therefore their suffering is unwarranted. This of course begs the question of whether their suffering would be warranted 
had they chosen to be sex workers under fewer economic constraints.  
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inspire a corrected understanding of poor people’s imputed behavior. At the beginning of the 
discussion sessions, I saw facilitators ask participants whether they bought food, read to their 
children, or committed any crimes or unethical acts. At a simulation Mary facilitated for 45 
students in a Master of Teaching program, “not one person asked their kid about homework or 
how school went, not one.” Mary suggested to a room full of people nodding their heads in 
agreement that throwing “a lot of those typical middle-class questions back” at participants was 
an effective method for opening their eyes to how and why the trauma of poverty prevents poor 
people from being conscientious parents and citizens—from being middle-class in a cultural sense. 
Facilitators thus (unintentionally) use stereotypes39 that poor people do not value education, are 
inattentive parents, and have a penchant for criminality to foster in participants the belief that if 
they were poor, they would also be caught in the tyranny of the moment and exhibit these 
stereotypical behaviors and attitudes. Advocating a method of calling out middle-class people for 
failing to live out their values not only suggests that shame is effective affective pedagogy, but 
leaves supposed middle-class values and practices “unmarked” (see Choo and Ferree, 2010). 
2.7 Emotions and Politics 
For the past three decades, scholars from across the social sciences have recorded and 
studied US Americans’ increasing skepticism of politics and mistrust in government (Putnam, 
 
39 In the US, these stereotypes are always racialized and racist. Black families are overrepresented in 
depictions and coverage of poverty and crime in cable news outlets, mainstream newspapers, and online news sites 
(Dixon, 2015; Intravia and Pickett, 2019).  
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2001; Eliasoph 1998). In the 1990s, this research led to a moral panic about the decline of social 
capital and active participation in public life (Putnam; neo-cons). More recent survey research has 
demonstrated that prevailing skepticism coexists with widespread civic participation (ANES). In 
their ethnographic study of how cynicism affects the culture of civic engagement, Bennett and 
colleagues (2013) develop the concept of ‘political disavowal’ to elucidate how citizens balance 
their desire for a vibrant democracy with their deep disenchantment with democratic politics. They 
find that actors who are very active in civil society erect symbolic boundaries between the 
disagreeable or ‘contaminated’ parts of public life, which they define as ‘political’ and from which 
they distance themselves, and its more attractive or aspirational aspects typically thought of as 
‘community’ or ‘civic’ matters. “When Americans claim they are not political,” the authors write, 
“they are not simply defining themselves by what they are not. They are disavowing the political—
rejecting knowledge of, connection to, or responsibility for the processes and consequences of the 
political—and simultaneously self-identifying with what they view as a more positive ideal of 
public engagement and social change” (2013: 530). One of the primary reasons people disavow 
the political is that they associate it with conflict but at the same time want to solve pressing social 
problems.  
The poverty simulation offers participants a means of participating in public life while 
avoiding conflict and engaging with a major social problem. Although poverty is the outcome of 
political-economic processes and any real attempt to reduce the poverty rate would require the 
wholesale reconfiguration and expansion of the welfare state and redistribution of wealth—
transformations that would necessarily involve conflict—facilitators believe it is possible, indeed 
advisable, to address poverty without contention. When I asked her whether she thought the 
simulation was political, Linda, a white woman in her late 60s who runs a non-profit devoted solely 
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to poverty and other simulations, replied, “I think it can be if you don’t handle it well” (emphasis 
mine). A poorly managed simulation is political, which she and other respondents treated as a 
synonym for contentious and unproductive.  
Good facilitators reduce the likelihood of conflict by focusing on poor people’s struggles 
and participants’ experiences of and feelings about those struggles and not so much on the broader 
political economic arrangements that structure them. As I mentioned briefly above, discussion 
sessions typically begin in small groups where participants are asked questions that center on their 
feelings. Like the feminist consciousness raising movement, simulation facilitators assume that 
people can learn something from their feelings, but unlike the movement they do not assume that 
something is political (see Sarachild 1968: 78). Instead, what facilitators assume people can learn 
from their experiences is the reality of poor people’s lives. This reality, in turn, is not political 
because it is the truth.  
Linda, who in May of 2018 had facilitated over 200 poverty simulations and could only 
remember one where there was any open conflict, explained further:  “I really don’t see so much 
[political] about it because what we’re doing is the reality of people’s lives no matter what’s going 
on in state capitals or what’s going on in Washington. The reality is that people are struggling, you 
know, to keep their families safe and housed and that’s what the simulation focuses on.” Michael, 
a white man in his late 50s who directs projects for a major human services agency in the southeast, 
also said he thought the simulation was not political and, when I asked him why, replied “because 
it’s just giving the things they’re being asked to do. It’s things that people in poverty do every day, 
that [they] have to face every day, hiccups of life. There is nothing political; this is just what it is.” 
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The simulation idiom of social problem engagement works to achieve consensus, or at least 
avoid conflict, not through rational debate or the aggregation of preferences and beliefs but rather 
a shared experience of suffering through a convincing representation of an other’s reality. 
2.8 Conclusion 
Scholars of poverty and the welfare state have long examined how the state and its 
surrogates discipline, regulate, and penalize the poor, but have paid less attention to the 
technologies that organizations use to modify the behavior and feelings of people the state expects 
to work on and engage the poor. In this article, I have examined an increasingly common 
organizational approach to shaping the attitudes, emotions, and behavior of doctors, social 
workers, teachers, nurses, and other professionals who serve and advise poor people: the poverty 
simulation. Rather than assess its effectiveness in shifting attitudes toward poor people, I 
investigated why simulation facilitators view the emotional transformation it supposedly inspires 
as a route to social change. 
From facilitators’ perspective, poverty is something you must feel to understand and 
believe. Facilitators cast traditional methods of teaching and learning about poverty as potentially 
biased or boring; rather than a trust in numbers typically associated with expert knowledge, 
facilitators display a trust in feelings to convince participants that being poor is difficult and 
thereby cultivate empathy. Though quantification has historically provided a common foundation 
for people with conflicting positions, facilitators view emotional experience as providing a basis 
for agreement on an otherwise ‘threatening’ subject. Facilitators trust specifically in emotions with 
a negative valence and high arousal value, including frustration, shame, distress, and anxiety, to 
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convince participants of the simulation’s validity. Interestingly, facilitators’ trust in feelings as 
catalysts of individual change dovetails with the emphasis that some social service providers, 
especially in small non-profit organizations, place on the importance of the “stories behind the 
numbers” in their grant applications. 
Facilitators’ emphasis on making participants suffer reproduces not only a flawed and 
potentially damaging notion that suffering begets enlightenment, but also several stereotypes about 
poor people that, ironically, they intend to combat. At the same time that facilitators foster high 
valence, negative affect they also seek to avoid conflict. From their perspective, focusing on the 
emotionality of the poverty simulation prevents discussions from veering into “the political,” a 
domain that facilitators view as unproductive even while dealing with a subject—poverty—that is 
a political product. Implicitly, then, facilitators expect participants, who are mainly middle-class 
white people, to withstand and learn from the unpleasantness of individualized suffering but view 
them as unable to tolerate the stress and distress of political conflict. The simulation, and the 
discourse of emotional trauma that pervades discussions that follow it and the culture of human 
service organizations that facilitate it, turns poverty into an event and thereby blinds participants 
to the fact that poverty is a normal, expected feature of liberal capitalism; it fosters the 
misrecognition of poverty as extraordinary when it is, in fact, deeply ordinary. It also produces an 
affect-oriented, individualistic account of poverty per se, which can slip easily into an 
individualistic, affective model of both the cause and the consequences as well as the remedies for 
poverty. 
Interestingly, the poverty simulation is growing in popularity as new disciplinary 
technologies are making it increasingly difficult for human service providers to develop and act 
on the social feelings that the simulation is meant to engender. Performance management systems 
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that monitor and assess workers’ compliance with documentation requirements and numerical 
benchmarks deter workers from forming relationships with clients and patients in ways that are 
consistent with the former’s notions of professionalism (Plummer, 2018). In welfare offices, 
performance pressures also drive most caseworkers to sanction or otherwise threaten or penalize 
clients who do not comply with program demands, regardless of caseworkers’ understanding or 
empathy for the latter’s circumstances (Soss, Fording, and Schram, 2011).   
More recently, intake screeners and service providers in cities and counties across the 
United States have started using automated ‘decision assistance tools’ to choose how to allocate 
rights/resources and when to initiate child welfare investigations. These tools score and 
occasionally rank poor people’s vulnerability or risk based on their answers to standardized 
questionnaires, use of means-tested resources, and/or history of punishment (Eubanks, 2018; Bosk, 
2018). The explicit purpose of these technologies is to limit workers’ discretion, i.e., their power 
to choose according to their judgment, and make their social feeling immaterial to client outcomes. 
At the same time, however, decision assistance tools cannot appropriately assess and prioritize 
people without accurate data about them, and people are probably more likely to voluntarily 
divulge such information to service providers who exhibit understanding and put them at ease. 
What’s curious about the poverty simulation, then, is that it generates negative affect that should 
somehow transmute into feelings that make other people comfortable. Future research should 
investigate if and how new disciplinary work regimes are related to the growth in the popularity 
of simulations and calls for empathy in social service provision.   
As an approach to social problem engagement, the simulation idiom is poised to grow more 
popular as advances in virtual reality technology expand opportunities to develop immersive 
environments that aim to foster social feeling and promote social change. Unlike the poverty 
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simulation, virtual simulations provide potential users the possibility of regular, individualized 
participation such that the learning in virtual “simulations for social change” could become 
practical, rather than just experiential. The practical possibilities of virtual environments heighten 
the chance that they will affect people’s behavior rather than just their (temporary) attitudes. 
Researchers should pay attention to the design intentions, content, and potential or real 
consequences of immersive simulations.    
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3.0 The Temporal Framing of Philanthropic Financial Advice-Giving 
3.1 Introduction 
Over the past several decades, the United States economy has undergone a process of 
financialization: a state-facilitated shift in the pattern of accumulation away from trade and 
commodity production and toward financial activities (Krippner, 2005, 2011). Financialization has 
had a profound effect on peoples’ everyday lives; their economic fates are increasingly linked to 
the performance of financial markets and their access to basic resources (e.g., housing, education, 
healthcare, retirement) is mediated by the financial system. As a result, individuals and households 
have accumulated a huge amount of financial assets and liabilities to meet their daily needs. This 
“financialization of workers’ revenue” is facilitated by the stagnancy of their wages, the 
privatization of formerly public services, and the shift in risk from government and business to 
workers (Lapavitsas, 2011; Hacker, 2006). The incursion of finance into people’s daily lives has 
not only made them more dependent on and vulnerable40 to financial services, but also changed 
their styles of self-governance and even their moral codes (Martin, 2002). 
 
40 The “financialization of workers’ revenue” allows banks and other financial institutions to make a profit 
directly from individuals’ wages, salaries, and assets, rather than surplus value. Lapavitsas (2009, 2011) refers to this 
mode of profit extraction as “financial expropriation.” The increasing dependence of individuals and households on 
money as a means of payment makes them vulnerable to financial institutions, whose advantages in “information, 
power, and motivation have allowed them to tilt transactions to their own benefit” (Lapvitsas, 2009: 132). 
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As people’s reliance on financial markets has grown, so too have financial 
literacy/education41 initiatives and the personal finance industry more generally (Olen, 2013). 
Between 2011 and 2019, the number of states where financial education is a high school graduation 
requirement increased from 13 to 19 (Cohen, 2019). In the first six months of 2019, Congress 
introduced at least six pieces of legislation aimed at encouraging financial education. Two would 
award competitive grants to state educational agencies to integrate financial literacy into public 
secondary schools (S.155) and nonprofit organizations or government agencies that provide 
financial literacy support to survivors of domestic violence (S.627), i.e., to both the general 
population and a particularly vulnerable population that is morally ‘good’. Congressional emphasis 
on the importance of financial literacy—and the role of public and private agencies in promoting 
it—has only intensified since the Great Recession, which legislators blamed (partly) on the poor 
decisions of a financially illiterate citizenry. Three years after the start of the financial crisis, 
Congress passed Dodd-Frank, which among other things created an Office of Financial Education 
within the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and the Senate held a hearing titled 
“Empowering Consumers: Can Financial Literacy Education Prevent Another Financial Crisis?,” 
during which legislators and witnesses lamented American consumers’ dearth of financial 
understanding.42 
 
41 Financial literacy is sometimes presented as the goal of financial education, but these terms are also used 
interchangeably.  
42 It is worth pointing out that in Congressional hearings on predatory lending practices, both before and after 
the crash, some witnesses and legislators frame targeted financial literacy initiatives as the way to prevent underserved 
groups, especially Black people, from losing access to credit. In a 2007 hearing, after noting the confusing complexity 
of financial services, Congressman David Scott (D-GA) argued that legislative “overreach” (i.e., stringent regulations 
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National and community-based nonprofit organizations have responded to the call to 
promote financial literacy, incorporating financial education and empowerment into their service 
repertoires. United Way, one of the largest private funders of social service programs in the world, 
lists financial empowerment as one of its three principal foci, and YWCA USA, one of the largest 
and oldest women’s organizations in the country, claims to reach over 100,000 women annually 
with financial literacy courses. Since 2003, the Center for Financial Social Work has offered an 
accredited Financial Social Work Certification program, which teaches social service professionals 
how to help their clients adjust their relationships with money.  
Financial education initiatives targeting poor, low-income, and “dependent” people (and 
those who work on them) are overlooked by scholars of the financialization of everyday life, who 
until recently have primarily focused on analyzing policy (e.g., Payne, 2011), popular culture (e.g., 
Haiven, 2014), and quantitative data on consumer investment and consumption (e.g., 
Montgomerie, 2009). To explain how the extension of financial markets affects subjectivities, 
scholars have drawn on theories of governmentality and performativity. Governmentality scholars 
contend that neoliberal discourses of individual responsibility and technologies like credit-scoring 
compel people to adjust themselves to financial logics and become self-governing entrepreneurial 
subjects and ‘investor citizens’ (see also Martin, 2002; Langley, 2008). The functionalist angle of 
 
on lending practices) would “dry up the credit” for Black people and other vulnerable populations typically targeted 
by predatory lenders. To avoid legislative overreach and consequent loss of access to credit, Congress should engage 
in a “major offensive on financial literacy and financial education.” He goes on to state that without a “serious financial 
literacy piece that is targeted at African Americans…we may very well have to revert to an overreaching legislative 
piece” (38). [If you ever want a tragic laugh, the transcript of this hearing includes assurances that the market is 
correcting itself]. 
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this argument suggests that the more people conform to market logics, the easier it is for the market 
to govern them. Performativity scholars similarly contend that economics does not merely explain 
how the economy functions, but produces the economic facts, behaviors, and subjectivities it 
claims to describe (Callon, 1998; MacKenzie, 2006). The original formulations of the relationship 
between financial discourse and everyday life were based largely on assumptions about the 
former’s strong influence on the latter. Recently, to understand the empirical link between 
discourse and practices, scholars have started observing and interviewing consumers and investors, 
arguing that shifts in individuals’ subjectivities are not necessarily total transformations 
(Pellandini-Simányi, Hammer, and Vargha, 2015), are contingent on existing relationships and 
rationalities (Gonzalez, 2015), and can be something individuals consciously seek to achieve by 
themselves and in small groups (Fridman, 2014, 2016). Yet, little of this research considers how 
financial advice is transmitted to consumers nor how financial advice-giving may be organized by 
ideas about different populations of consumers and their problems; it tends to focus on putatively 
homogenous (i.e., not stratified by race or gender) members of a uniformly-defined groups (e.g., 
middle-class homeowners) navigating the financial landscape on their own.  
I contribute to research on the financialization of everyday life by examining how it unfolds 
in a heretofore unstudied context: social service organizations. I compare how experts in two 
organizations that target different populations/problems43—women in (economic) transition44 and 
chronically/intergenerationally poor people—give financial advice to their clients. I draw a parallel 
 
43 In the social services (and oftentimes the social sciences), the production of “populations” is also the 
production of problems that can be managed through programs and policies.   
44 “Women in transition” is, in this case, emphatically not a reference to sex/gender transition. 
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between what Foucault refers to as the “repressive hypothesis,” i.e., the idea that Victorian era 
norms repressed free expression of and talk about sex and sexuality, and claims by personal finance 
experts, both popular and professional, that we are silent about money. I argue that this “money 
repressive hypothesis” provides experts what I call an “advisor’s benefit,” i.e., the appearance of 
being freed from silence about money and thus able to free others from silence and ignorance and 
guide them toward financial wellness. I then examine how experts’ enactment of the advisor’s 
benefit is conditioned by the organizations’ target populations/problems. I argue that “women in 
transition” and “intergenerationally poor people” are temporal frames, i.e., meaningful ways of 
intersubjectively organizing experience in reference to time, that invite different levels and forms 
of attention to the past, present, and future (Boden, 1997). The word “transition” suggests 
impermanence and a process or movement between two different states; it signifies transience and 
futurity, drawing attention to what’s next.45 “Intergenerational” and “chronic”, by contrast, suggest 
permanency and replication; they signify concern about the past, drawing attention to what 
habitually recurs.46 These temporal frames affect how personal finance experts give clients advice 
and attempt to shape their conduct. The futurity of “women in transition” encourages personal 
finance experts to work on and through clients’ aspirations and highlight the transitory aspect of 
their situations. The durability of “intergenerational/chronic poverty” leads personal finance 
experts to work on and through clients’ (traumatic) pasts and habits. I conclude with the suggestion 
that while it can be less depoliticizing than focusing on the future, emphasizing the habituality of 
 
45 Merriam-Webster defines “transition” as “passage from one state, stage, subject, or place to another: 
change” and “a movement, development, or evolution from one form, stage, or style to another.”  
46 Merriam-Webster defines “chronic” as “continuing again and again for a long time”; “always present or 
encountered”; and “being such habitually.”  
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(financial) thoughts and behaviors often implies deemphasizing the importance of money and 
material resources, not to mention structural and institutional factors, in explanations of poverty. 
The notion that poverty is about “more than money” is congruous with both neoconservative and 
neoliberal perspectives on welfare47 and arguably incongruous with the respect that many social 
service providers exhibit for poor people. Before turning to these substantive arguments, I describe 
my cases and methods. 
3.2 Cases and Methods 
The arguments I present here are based on an ethnography of financial advice-giving in 
social service organizations. Ethnographers place themselves as close as possible to the processes, 
practices, people, and places they research, observing and oftentimes participating in particular 
social worlds to understand the thoughts, feelings, and actions of the people (and objects) who 
inhabit them. I conducted sixteen months of fieldwork at two social service organizations located 
in a Rust Belt city I pseudonymously call Milltown. I selected these organizations because they 
had the same goal but different target populations, allowing me to compare how the latter 
organized their advice-giving practices.  
Working Women and Milltown Friends for Change (hereafter Milltown Friends) both aim 
to help their clients achieve economic self-sufficiency. The former serves “women in transition,” 
which it defines as “a woman who is experiencing a significant change in her life [including] 
becoming a widow after the death of her spouse; divorce or separation; leaving an unhealthy 
 
47 On the connections between neoconservative and neoliberal movements, see Cooper, 2017. 
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relationship; returning to work after caring for a family; or moving to a new city.” Among other 
services, Working Women offers free financial workshops and one-on-one financial coaching 
provided by certified financial planners or other personal finance experts. It is sex-category 
specific for clients and volunteers, class-specific for volunteers, and not means-tested for clients. 
I participated in thirty workshops and events focused on financial literacy and personal 
development and six one-on-one financial coaching sessions. I also interviewed three full-time 
staff members and five financial coaches. 
Milltown Friends is a chapter of Friends for Change USA, a network of franchises in 
around 60 cities in the United States and Canada. Friends for Change takes a “community-driven 
approach to breaking the cycle of intergenerational poverty,” matching a “motivated” low-income 
individual or family with a group of two to five middle- or upper-class volunteers to “build 
intentional friendships across class lines.” Prior to being matched, the low-income individuals are 
required to attend a 12-week training facilitated by a financial coach. Volunteers are required to 
attend a 5-week training that includes a poverty simulation and discussions about poverty, 
stereotypes, class, and boundaries. At the time I conducted my fieldwork, the Milltown Friends 
chapter had five sites, one of which required its volunteers to go through a 12-week training that 
included relatively sophisticated conversations about race and racism. I embedded myself at 
Milltown Friends as an AmeriCorps member at one of its sites, which gave me access to the 
quotidian operations of the organization. I participated in trainings for low-income individuals at 
one site (Milltown Friends-South) and the 12-week volunteer training at another site (Milltown 
Friends-East). I also participated in monthly network meetings of all Milltown Friends’ sites and 
Friends for Change’s annual conference. I interviewed 15 financial coaches, including all the 
coaches at the Milltown sites and at other sites across the United States. 
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In addition to ethnographic and interview data, I collected materials published by the two 
organizations that advertise and explain their programs to their target populations and volunteers 
as well as intake forms and training manuals. Finally, I collected materials recommended by 
clients, volunteers, and workers, including popular finance books and magazines. 
The arguments I elaborate are based on sentence-by-sentence open coding of qualitative 
data to create categories that I gradually refined to develop theoretical arguments. The analysis 
below is structured around vignettes that are distinctive in their details but representative of the 
temporal framing of personal finance experts in the context of philanthropic advice-giving under 
investigation.  
3.3 The Money Repressive Hypothesis and the Advisor’s Benefit 
Foucault (1978/1990) begins The History of Sexuality by repudiating what he calls the 
“repressive hypothesis”: the idea that the Victorian bourgeoisie repressed and muted sexuality and 
that we continue to be governed by their cultural prohibitions. The repressive hypothesis, as 
advanced by the Freudian left,48 links the rise of sexual repression to the development of 
capitalism, which requires that labor capacity expend itself in pleasurable activities only insofar as 
the latter enable its reproduction. Those who propose this hypothesis, which comes out of  
 
48 Foucault is somewhat opaque on exactly who is advancing the repressive hypothesis, but one can 
reasonably deduce that he is talking about the New Left, the Frankfurt School, and Freudian psychoanalysis.  
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psychoanalytic perspectives49, characterize repression’s operations as “a sentence to disappear, but 
also an injunction to silence, an affirmation of nonexistence, and, by implication, an admission 
that there was nothing to say about such things, nothing to see, and nothing to know” (Foucault, 
1978: 4). Foucault claims that the discourse on modern sexual repression is in fact part of an 
economy of discourses concerning sex that has proliferated since the eighteenth century. Far from 
a condemnation to silence, he writes, there has been “an institutional incitement to speak about 
[sex], and to do so more and more; a determination on the part of the agencies of power to hear it 
spoken about, and to cause it to speak through explicit articulation and endlessly accumulated 
detail” (18; emphasis in original); the repressive hypothesis, by convincing us we have not talked 
or thought about sex sufficiently or correctly, itself incites sexual discourse. Efforts to liberate 
‘natural’ sexuality from repressive power are therefore misguided because our conceptions of 
sexuality can never exist independently from the power relations that produce them.   
Personal finance experts, both famous and professional, propose their own kind of 
“repressive hypothesis” with respect to discourse on money: They contend that people are largely 
silent on the topic of money and deny its importance in their lives to their (severe) financial 
detriment. In every personal finance book that I have read and event or workshop I attended in the 
course of my fieldwork, people’s aversion to discussing money is mentioned at least once and 
 
49 Psychoanalysis and the repressive hypothesis are not equivalent in Foucault’s estimation. Whereas the 
repressive hypothesis “takes repression to be diametrically opposed to desire,” psychoanalysis “takes law [the 
fundamental principles of a culture] to be constitutive of desire” (Kelly, 2013: 56). But, for Foucault, both “appeal to 
the same essentially negative conception of the operation of power,” which is ultimately the conception of power 
against which he is arguing (ibid.). 
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often several times. Some experts, like Robert Kiyosaki (2017), author of Rich Dad Poor Dad,50 
contend that rich people like talking about money while poor people do not, suggesting there is a 
causal relationship between one’s willingness to talk about money and one’s success in acquiring 
it.51 Other experts claim that no one likes talking about money. ‘Wealth psychology expert’ 
Kathleen Kingsbury52 even trademarked the term “money silence” in her 2017 book, Breaking 
 
50 See Fridman (2016) for an excellent sociological examination of how Americans and Argentines use 
Kiyosaki’s ideas and play his board game, Cashflow, in an attempt to achieve “freedom from work.”  
51 I could not find definitive evidence of a relationship between socioeconomic status and comfort with or 
frequency of discussions about money. A 2015 survey of individuals with higher than average net worths conducted 
by Spectrem, a market research firm, showed that just 17 percent of parents said they would discuss their income or 
net worth with their children before they turn 18 (Lieber, 2015). Based on my fieldwork and previous sociological 
research, I think a representative survey would show class differences in who people talk to about money and what 
they talk about. Wealthier people have more structured opportunities to talk about investments with financial advisors 
and are more likely to help their children open bank accounts and open lines of credit in their name. Poor people are 
compelled to disclose their earnings and assets to the state to receive benefits and subsidies; to negotiate with courts 
about their ability to pay fines and fees; and to obtain child support payments (whether they want them or not). It’s 
possible that poor people are more likely than more affluent people to discuss the “value of a dollar” with their 
children.   
52 Kingsbury has published six books, including a weight loss book, Weight Wisdom: Affirmations to Free 
You from Food and Body Concerns (2003). It is not uncommon for women in the personal finance game to also offer 
(fatphobic) advice on weight loss. This genre overlap is not altogether surprising given the emphasis they both tend 
to place on (feminized) personal restraint. Personal finance experts also frequently use terms like “financial health,” 
“financial fitness,” and “financial wellness” to talk about individuals’ and families’ debts and assets; Google Ngram 
shows that the first two of these terms took off in popularity in the mid-1970s, whereas the latter goes unmentioned 
until the early 1980s. Wells Fargo’s Financial Health study, an online survey of about 1,000 adults in the US, asks 
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Money Silence®: How to Shatter Money Taboos, Talk More Openly about Finances, and Live a 
Richer Life, each chapter of which ends with a “Money Talk Challenge.” In her 2007 bestseller, 
Women & Money: Owning the Power to Control Your Destiny, famous television personality and 
author, Suze Orman, refers to a specifically gendered “conspiracy of silence” that keeps “women 
in the dark about financial matters” and “leads to inaction” (14).  
Given that the majority of personal finance experts are not leftists53, they do not link the 
repression of “money talk” to the emergence of capitalism, but many do link it to Puritanism, a 
religious reform movement that in the popular imagination matches the Victorians in prudishness 
and moralism.54 Speculating on the reason people do not believe in their ability to successfully 
 
respondents to compare their concerns about their financial and physical health. Kentucky’s failed attempt to institute 
Medicaid work requirements offered people who were removed from Medicaid for failing to meet said requirements 
the opportunity to reactivate their medical coverage by passing a health or financial literacy course. In sum, individual 
health and financial standing are increasingly imagined as two sides of the same coin; that coin is (in)security.  
53 Leftists, too, are concerned about silence with respect to money but for different reasons. Whereas personal 
finance experts are concerned about how silence impedes individual profit-making and success (e.g., Kingsbury, 
2017), leftists are concerned about how pay secrecy impedes collective action (e.g., Givan, 2017). One place where 
their concerns about silence overlap is its connection to the gender wage gap. The former advocate for training women 
to “lean-in,” “know their worth,” and practice negotiating—negotiating is itself a remedy for silence, a display of 
individual triumph over the societal injunction against money talk—while the latter focus on changing labor 
regulations. Liberals seek to improve flows of information to promote better market mechanisms; leftists seek to 
overcome management-imposed obstacles to solidarity.  
54 At the same time, some personal finance experts encourage frugality and thrift, “secular virtues” associated 
with both Puritanism and the prosperity gospel. The prosperity gospel celebrates thrift as a component of character, 
which explains who triumphs over “an unruly free-market economy” (Bowler, 2018: 227). Character, in the prosperity 
movement, is a composite of religious (faith, hope) and practical (thrift, industry) values that resonate with Americans’ 
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save and invest, Wasik (1995) writes, “Maybe you can blame the Puritans. Talking about money 
in groups was never seen as socially acceptable in the eyes of the priggish Pilgrims. Phrases like 
‘Money is the root of all evil’ and other biblical bromides have permeated the public conscious-
ness, to our detriment. It’s been one of those perverse love-hate relationships. We’d all love to 
have more money, but we hate to discuss it honestly” (xx), as though having honest discussion is 
the cause of having money. Cross (2017), an English professor and professional development 
expert, also points to Puritanism as the reason for Americans’ unique aversion to talking about 
money. “In other countries such as India,” she writes, “where people freely share their salary 
information, this taboo [against talking about money] seems not to apply. Income and family 
wealth are disclosed in other Western countries (for example, Switzerland), but Americans still 
seem to have that lingering Puritan idea that discussing money isn’t polite or proper” (65).  
Like the discourse on modern sexual repression, the discourse on money repression also 
has psychoanalytic antecedents. Freud (1908, 1917; in Carrington, 2014) identifies money with 
feces, arguing that money plays the role in adult emotional life that feces played in infantile life 
(see also Yuran, 2014). Using cultural references and insights gleaned from his clinical experience, 
Freud (1908; in Carrington, 2014) observes that adults with character traits of orderliness, 
parsimony, and obstinacy had a childhood predisposition to control their urge to defecate as a 
source of pleasure. Freud (1908; in Carrington, 2014) proposes that this inclination is linked to 
heightened anal erotism, which, as one ages and their interest in feces is repressed, is either retained 
 
national self-perception (Bowler, 2018). It can be cultivated through the practical use of techniques to “activate the 
mind’s hidden powers” (ibid. 229). There are some obvious if unacknowledged parallels among cultural sociologists’ 
(re)conceptualization of habitus, Weber’s focus on the Protestant ethic in cultivating the Spirit of Capitalism, and 
prosperity leaders’ understanding of character and the roles it plays in economic success.  
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as sexuality or transformed into character-traits through sublimation or reaction-formation (175). 
In both psychoanalytic thought and popular culture “anal character” implies stinginess and an 
extreme emotional relationship to money. For Freud (1908; in Carrington, 2014), the unconscious 
identification of money and feces, which we see in folklore, is rooted in the contrast between their 
values as “the most precious substance known to men and the most worthless” (174). The 
transformative connection between the disgusting and the desirable is, as Yuran (2014) points out, 
commonplace in psychoanalytic thought: “what we consider disgusting actually is something that 
originally attracted us but because it went through social prohibition, it became disgusting and was 
replaced by another, desirable object” (115-116).  Later, Freud (2017; in Carrington, 2014) argues 
that feces is the “first gift” an infant presents to its parents and therefore not just an object of 
personal interest and desire. The infant responds to its parents’ entreaties to use the toilet, a painful 
decision because the infant relates to its feces as “a part of his body which he will give up only on 
persuasion by someone he loves, to whom indeed, he will make a spontaneous gift of it as a token 
of affection” (32). This “sacrifice” is the cost of participation in a society that forbids the child’s 
interest in the “first gift,” prompting its transference to “the most valuable gift in life,” i.e., money. 
The sublimated equation of money with feces turns the former into something one should not talk 
about. From the psychoanalytic perspective, then, money is something we desire because of 
repression, and our desire for it is also repressed.  
Foucault (1978/1990) suggests that one of the reasons it may be “so gratifying for us to 
define the relationship between sex and power in terms of repression” is what he calls the 
“speaker’s benefit” (6). Because people view sex as repressed, prohibited and silenced, the person 
who dares to speak about it has the appearance of being transgressive. “A person who holds forth 
in such language places himself to a certain extent outside the reach of power; he upsets established 
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law; he somehow anticipates the coming freedom” (1978/1990: 6). Our keenness to speak about 
sex in terms of repression is sustained by feelings of liberation and enlightenment that come from 
the opportunity to speak truth to power. The repressive hypothesis affords people the possibility 
of subversion, which, Foucault proposes, “is perhaps what also explains the market value attributed 
not only to what is said about sexual repression, but also to the mere fact of lending an ear to those 
who would eliminate the effects of repression,” i.e., psychoanalysis (1978/1990: 7). Yet, Foucault 
contends, the repressive hypothesis’ popularity is probably best explained not by its market value 
but by a prevalent sermonic discourse that links together sex, revelation of truth, liberation from 
repression, and promises of future happiness (8). Institutionalized in medicine, therapy, and social 
science, the discourse of modern sexuality incites people to disclose and examine their sexual 
desires to understand the scientific truth about themselves and their pleasure. Scientific expertise 
offers knowledge and control of its objects simultaneously, regulating sexual desires and behavior 
by classifying them as “normal” or “abnormal.” Accepting expert knowledge, individuals become 
vigilant about the normalcy of their desires and complicitous in their own control, developing 
regimens to moderate their own desires and behaviors.  
Personal finance experts also have the performative privileges of a speaker’s benefit. By 
declaring the fact of the money taboo and then articulating their knowledge of money (especially 
of their relationship to money), they “appear to be freed, through the act of speech, from the space 
of repression” (Puar, 2014). Because they appear to have liberated themselves from “money 
silence” (Kingsbury, 2017), experts also appear to be equipped to guide clients toward freedom 
and future happiness. In a word, they appear not only to have the speaker’s benefit but also to be 
able to extend it to those who take their advice; I call this the “advisor’s benefit.”  
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In the remainder of this article, I examine how personal finance experts enact the advisor’s 
benefit in the context of social services. Public, private, and hybrid social service organizations 
targeting poor and low-income people have long been grounded in a tradition of philanthropic 
advice-giving. Whereas charity is gift-giving motivated largely by the emotions of sympathy and 
pity, philanthropy is advice-giving motivated by a desire to influence55 and enabled by formal 
equality (Donzelot, 1977/1997).56 Though philanthropic organizations have historically offered 
material aid “insofar as it would make for the penetration of…pieces of advice” (Donzelot, 
1977/1997: 68),  today many programs offer only advice or a combination of advice and the 
possibility of a distant reward.57 Lacking carrots or sticks, these organizations and the experts who 
 
55 The philanthropic perspective sees no difference between helping and influencing.  
56 “In general,” Donzelot writes, “philanthropy differed from charity in the choice of its objects, based 
on…concern for pragmatism: advice instead of gifts, because it cost nothing; assistance to children rather than old 
people, and to women rather than men, because such a policy would pay off, in the long run at least, by averting a 
future expense. Charity was alien to this kind of investment; it could only be kindled by fires of extreme misery, by 
the site of spectacular suffering, and then only for the feeling of inflated importance accruing to the giver through the 
immediate solace his charity brought to the sufferer. The exemplariness of the gift was in opposition to the 
gratuitousness of counseling, in that it was an exchange that presupposed two symbolically contrary and not abstractly 
equivalent poles” (1977/1997: 66-67).  
57 Though not my focus here, other advice-giving programs are accessories to the penal welfare state. For 
example, Child Protective Services almost always mandates that parents whose children it has taken attend parenting 
classes to regain custody of their children (Reich, 2005).  Job search and job readiness assistance activities, which 
often come with advice, count toward the work requirement of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, though 
only for six to twelve weeks in a year, thus precluding actual education as a route to increased earnings and escape 
from poverty and dependence on the state for direct subsidy for below-subsistence wages (Collins and Mayer, 2010).   
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staff them enact the advisor’s benefit to motivate client participation, disclosure, and self-
examination. I argue that how they do so is conditioned by how the organization defines its target 
population and the problem it is trying to address.   
3.4 The Future of Women in Transition 
Located on one of the busiest streets in one of the wealthiest neighborhoods in Milltown, 
the brick mansion that houses Working Women has a half moon driveway and stately white pillars 
adorning its entryway. It’s a Wednesday afternoon and I’m here for a “Digging Out of Debt” 
workshop. As I approach the door, Rachel, a program coordinator, buzzes me in. I step inside to 
the well-appointed foyer where Rachel, dressed in a mauve sheath dress and pointed flats, is sitting 
behind the front desk, looking slightly irritated. She tells me one of the clients is really “special” 
in the kind of way no one wants to be called special. Smirking, she hands me my nametag. I walk 
down the center hall, passing offices decorated with feminine but not girly accents, into a small 
room in the back where I am greeted by the workshop instructor, Veronica. A Black woman in her 
early forties with long, curly hair and wearing a pencil skirt and satiny blouse, Veronica shakes 
my hand firmly and invites me to take a seat. In front of me, and in front of every chair, is a 
calendar of Working Women’s upcoming events, printed with their signature purple lettering, and 
a green folder that says Citizens Bank and holds Veronica’s business cards and worksheets for 
making a budget and action plan.  
Aside from Veronica and me, there are nine other women in the room, eight of whom are 
white and middle-aged and one of whom is Black and in her twenties; all of us are casually dressed, 
especially in comparison to Veronica. Veronica tells us that she works as a Community Financial 
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Wellness Coordinator for Citizens Bank’s “Citizens Helping Citizens Manage Money” program, 
which aims to give “communities the resources, tools, and tips to make informed financial 
decisions and gain financial confidence” (Citizens, 2019).58   
Though the workshop is focused on debt—the kind you need to dig out of—Veronica 
begins by asking us: “if money were no object, what would you do?” Women begin raising their 
hands. The first says she would go back to school, to which Veronica replies that the woman should 
remember that money is no object, suggesting that a dream of going back to school is not big 
enough. Veronica wants her to shoot for the moon. The next client says she would complete her 
bucket list, travel, and fix her teeth.59 Another woman recites a long list: “buy my mom a house 
and car, learn to play violin and piano, get a financial planning certificate, dance ballet for exercise, 
give money to my favorite organizations…and buy an island!” 
Discourses about debt do not typically invite us to think about the future; they tend to center 
on the past or evoke the past to interpret the present. A full credit report, for example, displays past 
actions that led to the acquisition of different kinds of debt that (arbitrarily) structure one’s credit 
score. Yet, debt also harnesses the future to the past. Maurizio Lazarrato (2012) argues that debt 
is made understandable and functional through the promise of repayment, which requires memory: 
“making a person capable of promising means constructing a memory for him…a conscience, 
which provides a bulwark against forgetting” (45). One can only fulfill a promise if one has the 
memory of having made the promise. A memory of a promise to repay is therefore not created “for 
 
58 In August 2015, the CFPB ordered Citizens Bank to pay $18.5 million in refunds and penalties for failing 
to credit consumers the full amounts of their deposits when there were deposit discrepancies between receipts and 
actual money transferred to the bank.   
59 Teeth are the most visible and most discussed class marker among clients.  
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conserving the past” but is “a memory of the future” (Lazzarato, 2012: 45). “Memory is the means 
by which the creditor externalizes responsibility for indebtedness to the debtor in such a way as to 
seize control of the debtor’s future. For, in the act of promising, the debtor’s field of possibilities 
is constrained by the memory of debt, which makes them responsible by committing them to 
undertake forms of conduct that make them more likely to meet their responsibilities to the 
creditor” (Bowsher, 2019, summarizing Lazarrato).  As Veronica told me after the workshop, she 
used this icebreaker to “get everyone thinking about the world of possibilities after you transition 
out of debt.”  The debtor’s future may be in the creditor’s control, but, in Veronica’s eyes, only 
temporarily; the debtor can transition to a future where money is no object if she takes control of 
her present.  
Following the introductory exercise, Veronica provides some statistics about the national 
debt and average household credit card debt in the United States. She then proposes the repressive 
hypothesis, noting that most people are silent about money. “We are not alone,” she says. “The 
majority of us are in the dark about how we spend money. The majority of us lack control. How 
do we gain control?” The answer: a three-step budgeting process. The first step is tracking 
everything we spend—“ev-ree-thing,” says Veronica. The second step is to use the budgeting 
worksheet provided by Citizens, which “should become pretty detailed. Are you going to Six 
Flags? Are you getting your hair done? Nails?” Finally, “step three is to revisit the budget as you 
get insights into your spending behavior…My vice is Dunkin Donuts Iced Coffee. I realized I was 
spending $80 a month on iced coffee. So I went and got some Folgers and I make it at night, and 
I put it in the fridge. My coworkers laugh at me because I kept my Dunkin Donuts cup and I keep 
using it.”  
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"I love s'mores," a participant chimes in. "Starbucks has all of this s'mores stuff right now. 
So I went to the store and got all of the ingredients to make my own."  
"That's great!” Veronica replies, “You can really come into control of all of those things in 
your house, like utilities, to build a budget.” 
She then explains a “snowball method” for paying off debt, suggesting that we focus on 
the credit card with the smallest balance first, which “gives you fuel to keep going, like seeing 
weight lost when you get on a scale when you are dieting. Once you’ve paid off a credit card, leave 
it at home and walk away.”  
A nervous-looking woman in the corner then raises her hand to express some of the 
difficulties she has budgeting. “My husband will not drink coffee at home even though I offer to 
make it for him and it is just the same. So I watch him and I get angry and so to spite him I also 
drink coffee out. I find the idea of leaving the credit card at home difficult.”   
“Well,” Veronica replies, “this is a matter of discipline. Some people do envelope 
budgeting. Do you know what that is? You can do what you can if your husband won’t get on 
board…All of this takes discipline. Sometimes this is what we lack. But this is what it takes. And 
you have to monitor and revisit everything. People think of this as restrictive, but it’s really not. 
Because it gives you financial freedom and eventually you can buy that island!...As women, we 
don’t need to carry any unnecessary burdens around. It affects you and everyone around you. Think 
before you buy.” A woman raises her hand to share a tool that she uses to monitor her spending: 
“Before I make any purchase, I think about whether I’d be willing to sacrifice an hour of work for 
it.” 
Veronica’s emphasizes the power of discipline and control in the present to secure the 
futures women desire. She enacts the advisor’s benefit, claiming that we are silent about money 
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and personalizing the budgeting tool by sharing her own self-control strategies and linking the 
benefits of discipline to the alleviation of women’s burdens. In the process, she encourages 
participation and reframes the exploitative behaviors of others, e.g., the husband who will not make 
or accept coffee at home, as matters that can women can deal with by using discipline and 
creativity. She also reframes the policing of pleasure—the monitoring and revisiting of desires that 
led to spending—as necessary for the achievement of freedom, acknowledging that budgeting may 
seem “restrictive” but is really liberating.  
Later in the workshop, another woman explains that “my debt keeps me from addressing 
my needs. I lost two teeth and can’t afford to fix them. Another need I have is glasses. Insurance 
covers my vision check-up, but I can’t pick up my glasses because I can’t afford them…Starbucks 
and all this stuff, I can’t cut stuff like that because there is nothing to cut.” After acknowledging 
that “that’s real life” and “to dig out of debt you have to have resources,” Veronica states that “you 
can always rebuild” and “you have to get creative.” While she momentarily recognizes the 
‘paradox’ that digging out of debt requires resources—she later comments that she never 
understood why debt consolidation companies charge a fee—Veronica nonetheless touts the 
promise of creativity, eliciting suggestions from other clients who propose everything from selling 
her clothes in consignment stores to selling her car. 
Working Women and its staff and volunteers view clients’ financial problems as hurdles—
temporary objects—they can overcome provided the right advice from women who have 
successfully dealt with similar obstacles. Unlike experts on sexuality who rely on the authority of 
their knowledge, procedures, and categories to induce disclosure, Working Women’s personal 
finance experts draw on their own experience as successful women to garner information from and 
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advise their clients. In their dress and manner, they perform an approachable feminine 
professionalism that conveys composure and self-possession. 
Linda, a white woman in her 50s who is a certified financial planner and provides free one-
on-one financial coaching to Working Women’s clients, explains to me how she typically begins 
her sessions.  
It’s interesting because after working with several people you can 
tell if they have some resistance really opening up to you. And if 
they do, I just say let me just tell you a little bit about me. You know, 
I’ve been married twice, divorced twice, I have three children, I’m 
college educated, I have a professional career. But yet, this is where 
I was. You know, I had 25,000 dollars worth of credit card debt, but 
I had a house. I had my retirement. I was trying to compensate for 
my ex-husband who wasn’t involved. I say, so here I am someone 
who does financial planning and I was 25,000 dollars in credit card 
debt so you can’t tell me anything that is bad or is [going to receive] 
judgment or anything…I usually base how much I tell them about 
where I was and what I’ve done based on their openness…there is 
always an emotional root to what caused them to be there. And if I 
get some resistance, I tell them about what I’ve done. 
Linda calibrates her appeals to her experience with divorce and debt to her perceptions of 
clients’ (dis)comfort with disclosure. Highlighting the apparent contradiction between her 
profession and financial past, Linda tries to create a non-judgmental atmosphere to persuade the 
women she coaches to “be willing to say ‘I am in dire straits right now.’” Importantly, the 
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“emotional root” of these women’s financial instability is not planted in persistent struggle—the 
women Linda coaches “had 401ks and houses. They had master’s degrees”—or their childhoods, 
about which Linda says she does not “know much,” but rather in an event, typically a divorce or 
job loss, that “shook them to the core” and threatened their self-worth. Linda’s goal is “always to 
get them to realize they’re not alone. Other women have done this. They get through it. It’s a stage 
of life. Not a great one. But it’s doable.”  
The temporal framing of “women in transition” conditions how Working Women’s 
personal finance experts enact the advisor’s benefit. They downplay the effects of the past on 
women’s financial status and behavior, instead highlighting the temporary impacts of emotional 
events on their self-esteem.60 Marian, a financial coach with whom I met individually several 
times, connects women’s financial vulnerability to their reliance on men, “whether their husbands, 
fathers, brothers, or friends,” and advises me that I should always know about my household 
finances even if I am not the one in charge of managing them.61 A divorce or job loss can bring 
women’s dependence to the fore, revealing to them that they do not know basic information about 
their investments and retirement plans and striking a blow to their confidence. Yet, at Working 
Women, personal finance experts do not encourage women to ask themselves why they do not 
know—let alone if and how financial knowledge would make a material difference—or why 
relying on a man is “an automatic default,” as Judy, another financial coach put it. Instead, experts 
orient clients to the future, which they can learn to control through discipline in the present.  
 
60 Working Women also hosts personal development classes focused on cultivating positive self-images. 
61 While Working Women does not deny its services to anyone on the basis of sexuality—Rachel told me 
they have turned away more than one potential volunteer who exhibited homophobia explicitly or implicitly—it does 
assume the heterosexuality of its clients; one of its regular workshops is called “A Man is Not a Financial Plan.” 
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3.5 Chronicity and Poor People’s Trauma 
Milltown Friends-South holds its weekly evening meetings in the cafeteria of a Salvation 
Army located in one of the most economically depressed suburbs of Milltown. Tonight, twelve 
program participants are present for a class on budgeting led by Denise, a social worker and 
financial coach certified by Friends for Change. I arrive early to help set up for dinner, which 
Milltown Friends provides every week. Almost all the program participants—eight Black women, 
three Black men, and one white woman—know one another from the neighborhood or from 
previous meetings of Milltown Friends. After finishing our meal, Denise, a white woman in her 
early 40s dressed casually in jeans and a sweater, reminds us of the previous week’s class, which 
focused on the difference between “thriving” and “surviving.” According to the Friends for 
Change workbook, someone who is thriving has a good job that allows them to set aside money 
for emergencies and their future, while someone who is surviving lives day to day and has a scary 
and uncertain future.  
Denise asks us, “where do you think you are in the range of thriving to surviving?” Cecil, 
a Black man in his 50s who used to operate a forklift at a steel mill and now operates one at 
Walmart, replies that he is thriving and “off all the benefits.” Janette, an older Black woman 
wearing a t-shirt of the daycare center where she works, replies that she “falls in the category of 
surviving because I settle for less than my full potential and am always thinking about right now.” 
Monica, a Black woman in her late forties who is trying to get a jewelry business off the ground, 
replies that she goes back and forth between stability and uncertainty, which exasperates her. 
Denise reminds us that a “microwave mindset”—an impatient desire for instant gratification—
often emanates from childhood and the trauma of growing up in poverty, suggesting the deep 
rootedness of participants’ financial issues.  
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After a few more people explain whether they are surviving, thriving, or doing something 
in between, Denise asks us what feelings we have about budgeting. One woman replies that it’s 
something she needs to do. Lindsay, the lone white woman in the group, says,  
“I have a payee62 because I’m not responsible enough when I get money. I just blow it. Used to be 
on alcohol and cigarettes.” LaToya, a younger Black woman, replies that she would never want 
someone else in control of her finances.  
Drawing our attention to our past and present struggles rather than our aspirations for the 
future, Denise asks, “has anyone experienced months where you don’t have enough money?” 
Yvette, an older Black woman, replies “I don’t have money to do my laundry. The clothes are 
piling up everywhere.” Another woman interjects, “credit cards will get you in trouble. I have four 
or five that I don’t want because the companies be targeting you.” Denise responds that when she 
was laid off a few years ago she applied for credit cards that she just recently paid off, enacting 
the advisor’s benefit by revealing a shared struggle.  
“But sometimes credit cards are not bad,” Denise continues, “so when or how are they 
good for you?” Sherri, a young Black woman who just moved back to Milltown-South, responds, 
“to build your credit. But they keep trying to give me prepaid [cards]63, but then I have to buy my 
 
62 Lindsay is referring to a representative payee, which is a person appointed by the Social Security 
Administration to manage benefit payments and financial affairs for someone who is unable to do so on their own. 
Lindsay receives Supplemental Security Income, a disability benefit for people with limited income.   
63 Banks actively market prepaid bank cards to the set of people commonly referred to as “unbanked,” 
typically poor and low-income people without access to traditional checking accounts. You can use them to deposit 
money, make purchases, access cash at an ATM, and receive direct deposits for paychecks and/or government benefits 
(e.g., unemployment).  Prepaid cards do not help people build credit and also carry high fees for withdrawing money 
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own credit. I don’t agree with that.” Debra, a Black woman in her 60s, says, “I keep credit cards 
in the closet in a box. I have a Victoria’s Secret card that my granddaughter took and spent $250. 
My daughter asked for three cards and I said no.” Denise replies, “that’s good to say no. These 
days credit is your livelihood. You have to learn to value it.” Sherri exclaims, “I just got back to 
Milltown-South from [out of state] and it’s all the hood to me and it’s the projects and they’re 
running credit checks for the hood. I just don’t understand.” Denise, shaking her head in sympathy, 
tells the group that it’s important to beware of prepaid cards and predatory lending, affirming group 
members’ experience of being targeted by credit card companies and neglected by banks. She 
refers them to Twin Accounts, a tool designed by the Local Initiatives Service Corporation and 
offered at a local social service agency that helps low-income people build credit and save money. 
Turning to the next page of the Friends for Change workbook, Denise asks, “How do you 
complete the sentence: when it come to money, I ____________________?” “don’t usually think 
about saving because it’s replaceable,” says one person. “Money is miserable,” says another. 
“Money gives me a rush,” replies Yvette. “Similar to an addiction?” asks Denise. “Yeah,” says 
Yvette, “It used to be ladies used to have a nice dress, and now it is about the purse.” “Your 
appearance,” Sherri concurs, “for women it’s the bag. It’s the name brand. Kids wanna know if 
something is Gucci or Louis Vuitton.”  
“When you say these things, where did you get those thoughts from? Where does it come 
from?” asks Denise. “Seeing my Mom struggle and knowing we were poor at such a young age. I 
 
from an ATM, adding money to the card, etc. “Secured” credit card issuers do report to the major credit bureaus. 
Secured credit cards offer people with no credit history the opportunity to put down a minimum deposit (e.g., $49) to 
receive a small line of credit (e.g., $200). It is unclear whether Sherri is referring to prepaid or secured credit cards; 
the former require you to pay money to use your money whereas the latter require you to pay, via a deposit, for credit. 
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wish I could take care of my Mom,” replies Janette. “Just never having enough,” says Sherri, 
“Always wanting more.” After a few more participants respond, pointing to their experiences of 
scarcity, Denise responds: “you learn about money based on experiences and what has been taught 
to you from a young age. At Milltown Friends, we want to transform this knowledge.” From 
participants’ perspective, their lifetime experiences of deprivation have conditioned their desires, 
but not necessarily their financial knowledge. Denise, however, emphasizes that Milltown Friends’ 
primary objective is to transform participants’ knowledge, rather than their experiences of 
deprivation, let alone the structural conditions that produce deprivation. For Denise, gaining 
knowledge about the origins of their desires helps participants understand them and thus both feel 
less shameful about them— “there’s nothing wrong with wanting to reward yourself,” she says—
and develop habits to control them. Like Working Women’s financial coaches, Denise draws on 
her personal experience of dealing with debt to enact the advisor’s benefit. However, rather than 
framing financial challenges as a stage or disruption, she presents them as emanating from deeply 
rooted recurrent experiences. 
The temporal framing of “intergenerational poverty” orients Friends for Change’s financial 
coaches toward participants’ pasts, which they view as traumatic. From the coaches’ perspective, 
the trauma of chronic poverty impairs people’s ability to think. To counteract the effects of poverty 
on participants’ thinking and knowledge development, coaches work on and through their 
psychological habits. While Friends for Change’s coaches certainly emphasize the importance of 
long-term thinking and goal-planning, they view working through trauma as a prerequisite for 
achieving aspirations. When I ask Shelly, a White woman in her 50s who directs a Friends for 
Change chapter in a southern US state, why her participants are able to change their financial 
situations, she immediately points to her chapter’s focus on the trauma of chronic poverty:  
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I think our recognition, and a lot of the studies are showing, that 
growing up in poverty—and it most refers to generational poverty—
growing up in poverty is itself trauma and that while you’re growing 
up when you don’t know when you’re going to eat, you don’t know 
where you’re going to sleep next week or even tonight. When 
you’ve got all these things going on, that literally, your brain has 
been so much in the stressor hormones that you really don’t develop 
the ability to think. Again, because you are in survival mode all your 
life and we see this over and over again. The concepts of goal 
setting, the concept of long-term thinking is just not there. And it’s 
not because they’re not smart, it’s not because they don’t want to, or 
they don’t get it…We tell them you can retrain your brain and we’re 
going to help you do that.  
Friends for Change’s financial coaches highlight the cognitive impacts of trauma to enact 
the advisor’s benefit. For a coach like Shelly, who has never been poor, conceptualizing poverty 
in terms of trauma offers a nonjudgmental (though not completely non-pathologizing) way to 
approach the uncomfortable practice of working on individuals’ thoughts and behavior. For a 
coach like Jess, a white woman in her mid-30s who grew up poor and is a coach and program 
coordinator at Milltown Friends-South, talking about trauma affords a way to discuss both her 
current financial stability and the persistent effects of experiencing poverty as a child. Though she 
is married, owns two homes, and has a master’s degree and stable job, Jess tells participants and 
me that she still “overstocks [her] home with food”, “can’t drink anything without carbonation”, 
and “doesn’t like to think or talk about money”; she has made it out of poverty but its effects have 
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not made it out of her. Highlighting her both success and ongoing struggle, Jess invites participants 
to reflect on the traumatic roots of their (financial) thoughts and behavior and acknowledge that 
changing one’s habits—“retraining the brain,” as Shelly says”—takes continuous work. 
Discussions of trauma are often embedded in what I call “more than money” discourse, 
i.e., the idea that poverty implies more than not having enough money. More than money discourse 
draws needed attention to the manifold effects of poverty on emotional well-being, social 
integration, political participation, and physical and mental health, but it also suggests that money 
is not sufficient, and perhaps not even necessary, to solve poverty or poor people’s problems. More 
than money discourse centers trauma because its (scientifically proven; see above) lasting effects 
on decision-making cannot be addressed by money, but rather by advising that draws out the 
connections among people’s thoughts, behavior, and chronic experience of poverty.  
Rochelle, a Black woman in her early 50s who is a real estate consultant and financial 
coach at Milltown Friends-East, explains how her definition of poverty has changed over time: 
At one point in my life I would have defined poverty as not having 
enough money…that is still a piece of it, but for me, what I’m 
learning and have learned as I have gotten older and have more 
experiences is that poverty is created by thinking and how we think. 
How we think about ourselves and how we think about our ability 
to do more. How we perceive other people’s opinions of us…I think 
poverty is a thief. It’s a thief of many things. It’s a thief of mental 
health, of hope…When we are addressing poverty and how we 
reduce the barriers to folks reaching self-sufficiency, we have to 
think of it that way. We can’t automatically go to, “well, you know, 
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they don’t have enough money so if we figured out a way to give 
them more money---” because money is honestly, I think the last 
thing that we need to be focused on. What I want to be doing at 
Milltown Friends-East is preparing and healing, and giving people 
space to understand their current situation, to truly understand it. Not 
just, “I can’t pay my rent and I got to figure out—” to take a breath, 
to stop and to really analyze how did we get here, “How did you get 
here? What needs to be adjusted in the way that we think to get us 
out?” Just throwing money is not resolving anything, it’s not 
resolving trauma that is a natural occurrence of long-term exposure 
to poverty.  
Rochelle goes on to mention a conversation she had with someone at the county 
Department of Human Services (DHS) who told her about a case competition for local graduate 
students to develop programs to directly distribute funds to vulnerable residents. The DHS 
employee asked her whether she thought that would be helpful. She tells me that for her “the 
answer is no because is having an additional amount of money monthly in their household going 
to be beneficial? Absolutely, but it’s only going to be beneficial if you are addressing your trauma 
and you have a plan because if you don’t have any of those things, you’re just going to continue 
in the decision-making processes impacted by the trauma.” Rochelle recognizes the absolute 
benefit of having more money every month and later in the interview expresses her deep frustration 
with the perverse and contradictory incentives and penalties of benefits cliffs. Yet, the temporal 
framing of “intergenerational poverty,” and her professional and personal experience dealing with 
the effects of trauma, condition her assertion that money is not a solution to poverty.  
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The idea that poverty is about more than money can sometimes conflict with financial 
coaches’ commitment to being nonjudgmental and respectful about program participants’ 
knowledge and skills. Though Milltown Friends’ financial coaches never blame poor people for 
their economic situations—they, in fact, talk frequently about things like institutional racism, 
political disempowerment, and deindustrialization—their focus on the lasting psychological 
effects of past trauma ultimately implies that poor people are defective in some respect. Sara, a 
white woman in her late 20s who is a program coordinator for Milltown Friends-East, implicitly 
confronts this tension when she explains what she means when she says that poverty is about more 
than money. 
We talk a lot about what was your first experience with money and 
for a lot of people the answer would be their families avoiding it, 
ignoring bill collectors, not answering the phone when credit card 
companies call. Those experiences are foundational to people’s 
financial habits. They inform kind of everything in terms of how 
people think about money and if you don’t have the ability and the 
resources to kind of cope with the trauma and cope with the history, 
you can throw as much money at someone if you want but if…their 
ability to do those other things isn’t there and their ability to come 
and dig deeper and resolve some of that trauma, if that opportunity 
hasn’t existed nothing will change. You know, the money will be 
spent the month they get it, and it’s not just about teaching financial 
habits…I mean, there’s so many programs where all you are doing 
is like ‘this is how you budget, this is how you save, and this is this 
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stuff.’ It’s not about people not knowing how to do those things, 
people are brilliant and that’s not assuming they’re not. It’s just 
about so much more. 
Sara wants to distinguish Milltown Friends from programs that focus solely on budgeting 
and saving, which in her eyes condescendingly assume that poor people are not brilliant and don’t 
know how to do things. At the same time, however, she suggests that if you gave poor people 
money, they would spend it immediately, not just because of poor financial habits—and certainly 
not because of lack of brilliance—but because of unresolved trauma.  
The temporal framing of “intergenerational poverty” organizes how Milltown Friends’ 
financial coaches enact the advisor’s benefit. While they emphasize the importance of goal 
planning and future thinking, they view working through past trauma as an ongoing process that 
conditions future possibilities. The idea of trauma affords coaches who have never been poor with 
nonjudgmental language to talk about individual maladjustments and coaches who have been but 
are no longer poor with language to discuss and account for both their triumphs and ongoing 
challenges. Milltown Friends’ financial coaches connect poor people’s financial instability and 
“survival mentality” to long-lasting economic deprivation but contend that the psychological 
consequences of the deprivation-induced trauma turn poverty into a phenomenon that cannot be 
solved by money alone. Highlighting the psychological effects of poverty helps financial coaches 
avoid blaming participants for their financial situations and in some ways sustains demand for their 
expertise but arguably conflicts with their commitment to respect poor people’s knowledge and 
abilities.  
  110 
3.6 Conclusions 
The financialization of the US economy has deeply affected people’s everyday lives, 
making them more reliant on and vulnerable to financial services. As people’s dependence on 
financial markets has increased, so too have the number of financial education initiatives in 
primary and secondary schools, colleges and universities, and social service organizations. Social 
scientific research on the financialization of everyday life has largely neglected the incursion of 
financial literacy initiatives into these spaces, focusing instead on the effects of financialization on 
popular culture, policy, and consumer behavior. Recently, researchers have started to examine the 
relationship between financial discourse and the everyday practices and interpretations of 
consumers, who are typically portrayed as homogenous members of uniformly defined groups. 
While these researchers have offered important insights into how financial discourse shapes 
consumers’ subjectivities, they often overlook the role of an important figure in everyday financial 
lives: the financial advisor.  
In this article, I have contributed to research on the financialization of everyday life by 
examining the practice of philanthropic financial advice-giving in two social service organizations 
that cater to different populations/problems, i.e., women in (economic) transition and 
chronically/intergenerationally poor people. Popular and professional personal finance experts 
advance the “repressive hypothesis” that we are silent about money and that this silence prevents 
us from achieving the self-control necessary for financial stability. This money repressive 
hypothesis provides personal finance experts an “advisor’s benefit”—the appearance of being 
freed from silence about money and thus able to liberate others from silence and steer them toward 
financial wellness.  
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How personal finance experts enact the advisor’s benefit is conditioned by the temporal 
frames of the population/problem they address. In counseling “women in transition,” personal 
finance experts work on and through clients’ aspirations, drawing on their own experiences of 
transition to highlight the temporary effects of emotional events on women’s (financial) self-
esteem.  In advising “intergenerationally poor people,” financial coaches work on and through 
clients’ past experiences and habits, emphasizing the long-lasting effects of trauma on poor 
people’s cognitive and emotional development.  
Both Working Women and Friends for Change provide valuable advice to the people they 
serve, and they do so without blaming or criticizing them for their financial situations. In both 
settings, financial experts describe their approach as “nonjudgmental.” They treat clients and 
program participants respectfully and sympathetically, effectively eliciting disclosure of their 
financial situations and aspirations and helping them work toward their goals and/or through their 
trauma. Yet, the futurity of Working Women’s emphasis on “transition” discourages a deeper 
reckoning with the past, which could provoke women to examine the patriarchal relations that 
financial experts identify as the underlying reason for women’s lack of financial knowledge. By 
contrast, Friends for Change’s orientation toward participants’ traumatic pasts invites them to 
consider how systemic economic deprivation affected their lives, creating the opportunity for them 
to develop a critical perspective on relations of inequality. Yet, financial coaches’ emphasis on the 
long-lasting effects of trauma and the habituality of (financial) thoughts and behaviors can also 
imply that more than money or material redistribution is necessary to address poverty, an idea that 
coheres with neoliberal and neoconservative perspectives on the welfare state. Furthermore, 
focusing on poor people’s psychological development can discursively undermine or conflict with 
coaches’ commitment to respecting and valuing poor people’s intelligence and skills.  
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Future research should examine how financialization unfolds in social service 
organizations with different target populations/problems as well as organizations without 
eligibility criteria, paying attention to how different temporal frames open up distinct possibilities 
and constraints. Ethnographers who gain access to one-on-one personal finance advising sessions 
could offer important insights into how the enactment of the “advisor’s benefit” works in those 
settings and whether it varies by clients’ and advisors’ racial and gender identities. The social 
phenomenon of giving and receiving (financial) advice is central not only to the practices of 
philanthropic organizations, but to everyday life in general, and merits greater social scientific 
attention.  
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